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Abstract 
This chapter reviews the empirical evidence on the levels and trends in 
income/consumption inequality and poverty in developing countries. It 
includes a discussion of data sources and measurement issues, evidence 
on the levels of inequality and poverty across countries and regions, an 
assessment of trends in these variables since the early 1980s, and a 
general discussion of their determinants. There has been tremendous 
progress in the measurement of inequality and poverty in the 
developing world, although serious problems of consistency and 
comparability still remain. The available evidence suggests that on 
average the levels of national income inequality in the developing world 
increased in the 1980s and 1990s, and declined in the 2000s. There was 
a remarkable fall in income poverty since the early 1980s, driven by the 
exceptional performance of China over the whole period, and the 
generalized improvement in living standards in all the regions of the 
developing world in the 2000s.  
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1. Introduction 
Poverty and inequality are certainly among the main concerns in the developing world. 
A typical developing country is characterized by high levels of material deprivation, and 
large dispersion in individual wellbeing, at least when compared to a typical high-
income economy. Fighting poverty and minimizing the unjust inequalities are top 
priorities in the developing world. The United Nations, in the famous declaration of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), proposed as target number 1 to halve income 
poverty from 1990 to 2015. The reduction of inequality does not occupy the same 
privileged position in the agenda, but few would not list it as a central social concern.  
While chapter 9 of this Handbook deals with poverty and inequality in advanced 
economies, this chapter documents patterns and changes in the developing countries. 
There is no need to argue about the relevance of including a separate chapter in the 
Handbook: the developing world is home of 85% of total world population, and bears 
levels of poverty and inequality far higher than in the rich nations. While in a typical 
developing economy the share of people striving to survive with less than 2 dollars a 
day is more than 30%, that share is close to zero in the industrialized countries. In fact, 
on this basis poverty is an issue exclusively of the developing world. The differences in 
income inequality are presumably also large, although the comparisons are hindered 
by the fact that national household surveys typically capture income in developed 
countries and consumption expenditures in developing ones.  
High poverty and inequality are pervasive characteristics of the developing world; 
however, they are not immutable features of these economies. There is convincing 
evidence pointing to a robust decline in the levels of absolute income poverty over the 
last decades, and substantial progress in the reduction of deprivation in various non-
monetary dimensions - education, health, sanitation, access to infrastructure. Changes 
in income inequality have been much less clear, as relative inequality has risen in some 
countries and fallen in others. In fact, the evidence suggests that on average the 
developing countries are today (2014) somewhat more unequal than three decades 
ago.   
This chapter reviews the empirical evidence on the levels and trends in income 
inequality and poverty in developing countries. We focus the analysis on the 
income/consumption approximations to welfare; in particular the chapter deals mainly 
with relative inequality across individuals in household consumption expenditures per 
capita, and with absolute poverty defined over that welfare variable, and considering 
alternative international lines defined in US dollars adjusted for purchasing power 
parity (PPP). This choice is restricted by space limitations and does not imply ignoring 
that a general assessment of poverty and inequality should also include other non-
monetary dimensions (e.g. health, education) and other monetary variables (e.g. 
wealth). Other chapters in the Handbook contribute to fill those gaps.  
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The analysis in this chapter is mostly focused on inequality and poverty within 
countries and not within supra-national regions or in the world.1 Although issues of 
global inequality are increasingly relevant, inequality is still primarily a national 
concern. People are generally worried about inequality mainly in their countries, and 
public policies are typically aimed at reducing disparities among individuals within 
national boundaries.  
The empirical evidence shown in this chapter is drawn from the academic literature, 
regional and country papers, and open-access databases, in particular the PovcalNet 
project developed in the World Bank. Although most of the evidence is based on 
statistics obtained from national household surveys, we also report results from tax 
records (the World Top Incomes Database, WTID) and international surveys (the Gallup 
World Poll) to illustrate some issues. Even though the main purpose of the chapter is 
presenting basic evidence on levels and trends, we also briefly review the main 
discussions on determinants of recent changes in inequality and poverty.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly characterize the 
economies in the developing world, and discuss the data sources and some 
measurement issues. The following two sections are assigned to the main topic in this 
volume – inequality. In section 3 we document the levels of income inequality in the 
developing world, while in section 4 we summarize the evidence on trends since the 
early 1980s. The next two sections repeat the sequence for poverty: section 5 
compares levels across countries, and section 6 summarizes trends and discusses the 
evidence at the regional level.2 Section 7 closes with a summary and some final 
remarks.   
 
2. The developing world: characterization and data  
In this section we briefly characterize the economies of the developing world, and 
review the sources of data to measure and analyze income poverty and inequality.  
 
2.1. Developing countries  
The division between developed and developing countries is a helpful simplification 
that can be done in different arbitrary ways. In this chapter we follow the World Bank’s 
main criterion based on gross national income (GNI) per capita: developing countries 
are those with per capita GNI below a certain nominal threshold (US$ 12,276 in 2011). 
These nations are usually classified into six geographical regions: East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
                                                     
1 Global inequality is analyzed in chapter 12 of this volume.  
2 The separate treatment of inequality and poverty is somewhat artificial, as they are just two 
characteristics of the same income distribution. However, and despite some possible overlapping and 
duplications, we prefer to follow most of the literature and discuss both concepts separately. 
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The Appendix includes a list of all the developing countries in each region with their 
populations.3 The developing countries cover almost 75% of the total land area in the 
world and represent 85% of the total population. Table 1 summarizes some basic 
demographic and economic statistics.  
 
Table 1 
Population, GNI per capita and Human Development Index, 2010 
Developing countries, by region 
 
Source: population is taken from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita in international dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) and in current US$ 
(Atlas method) are taken from World Development Indicators. The Human Development Index (HDI) is 
from the UNDP Human Development Report. GNI and HDI are unweighted averages across countries. 
 
According to these indicators Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the most developed 
region in the group: per capita GNI is almost twice the mean for the developing world, 
and the Human Development Index (HDI) is significantly higher. Latin American and 
the Caribbean ranks second, and Middle East and North Africa third. Although 
economic growth in Asia has been remarkable in the last decades, per capita GNI and 
other development indicators are on average still below the mean of the developing 
world. South Asia is significantly less developed than East Asia and the Pacific. Sub-
Saharan Africa is the poorest and least developed region of the world. The mean of the 
national per capita GNIs in that region is less than 50% of the developing world mean, 
and less than 10% of the mean of the industrialized economies. 
 
2.2. Data sources  
National household surveys are the main source of information for distributive 
analysis. Since one of the central goals of these surveys is measuring living standards, 
they typically include questions to construct a monetary proxy for wellbeing: income 
                                                     
3 In this chapter we include emerging economies as part of the developing world, a decision that implies 
some overlapping with chapter 9. In the period under analysis some countries graduated from the set of 
developing countries; to avoid selection bias we do not drop them from the analysis.  
Countries Population (millions) PPP
Atlas 
method HDI
Developing countries 153 5,840 7,023 4,291 0.608
East Asia and Pacific 24 1,961 4,911 2,992 0.619
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 30 478 12,558 7,815 0.751
Latin America and the Caribbean 31 584 9,789 6,433 0.706
Middle East and North Africa 13 331 6,462 3,647 0.636
South Asia 8 1,633 3,429 1,704 0.535
Sub-Saharan Africa 47 853 3,288 1,798 0.450
Developed countries 62 1,055 37,303 38,818 0.85700
Total 216 6,894 15,682 14,181 0.663
GNI per capita
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and/or expenditures on consumption goods. Although some developing countries 
started to implement national household surveys after World War II, it is only recently 
that governments engaged in programs of regularly collecting information through 
household surveys, often with the help of some international organization. Distributive 
statistics for the developing world are rare before the 1970s, and reasonably robust 
only from the 1990s on. There has been a remarkable increase in the availability of 
national household surveys over the last decades. A chapter like this one, that includes 
a broad assessment of income inequality and poverty in developing countries, could 
hardly have been written two decades ago, and is a sign of the huge progress made on 
data collection. However, as we discuss below, data limitations are still stringent, and 
allow only a still blurred picture of inequality and poverty.  
The databases for international distributive analysis can be classified into two groups: 
those that produce statistics with microdata from surveys or administrative records, 
and those that collect, organize and report summary measures. The former group 
includes the World Bank´s PovcalNet, the Luxembourg Income Study, the World 
Income Distribution database, the World Top Incomes Database and some regional 
initiatives. The second one includes the seminal work by Deininger and Squire (1996) 
and its follow-up - the WIDER´s World Income Inequality Database, the All the Ginis 
database, and some other projects. 
The main source of information for poverty and inequality analysis at a large 
international scale in the developing world is the World Bank´s PovcalNet, a 
compilation of distributive data built up from national household surveys, generally 
fielded by national statistical offices. PovcalNet, used for the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, includes statistics constructed mostly from household survey 
microdata, and in some few countries from grouped tabulations. At the moment of 
writing this database includes more than 850 surveys from almost 130 countries, 
representing more than 90% of the population of the developing world, spanning the 
period 1979-2011. The website of PovcalNet provides public access to data to generate 
estimates for selected countries and alternative poverty lines from grouped data.4 
Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen, the developers of PovcalNet, have produced 
several papers exploiting the dataset (Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Chen and Ravallion, 
2001, 2010, 2012). This project has been increasingly influential in shaping the 
assessment of inequality, and in particular poverty, in the developing world by 
researchers and policy practitioners. It is, for instance, the source used to monitor the 
poverty-reduction goal of the MDGs. This chapter draws heavily on statistics computed 
in the PovcalNet project.  
Some regional initiatives aimed at estimating social statistics from harmonized 
household survey microdata are useful to study distributive issues in specific 
                                                     
4 Statistics are derived from the estimation of a general quadratic and a beta Lorenz curves from 
grouped data. Shorrocks and Wan (2008) propose an algorithm that reproduces individual data from 
grouped statistics with a higher degree of accuracy. 
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geographic areas, and as sources of information for world databases. For instance, the 
Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), jointly 
developed by CEDLAS at Universidad Nacional de La Plata (Argentina) and the World 
Bank’s LAC poverty unit, includes distributive and labor statistics for LAC constructed 
using consistent criteria across countries and years. BADEINSO, developed by the 
United Nations´ ECLAC, is also a large and good-quality database on social variables in 
LAC. In Eastern and Central Europe the World Bank ECA database includes statistics for 
28 countries since 1990 computed from direct access to household surveys. The 
Household Expenditure and Income Data for Transitional Economies developed by 
Branko Milanovic in the World Bank is the predecessor of that database. Milanovic has 
also built the World Income Distribution (WYD) database, which includes data for five 
benchmark years (1988, 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2005) for 146 countries, 75% obtained 
from direct access to household surveys. The dataset has been used in several studies 
to compute global inequality (Milanovic, 2002, 2005, 2012). The Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS), described in chapter 9 of this volume, includes distributive information 
computed from household survey microdata for developed countries. LIS also reports 
statistics for several transitional economies in Eastern Europe and recently has added 
some developing countries in Latin America (Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Peru and Uruguay).  
The growth in the availability of distributive statistics stimulated efforts to gather and 
organize them. Deininger and Squire (1996) put together a large dataset of quintile 
shares and Gini coefficients for most countries since World War II taken from different 
studies and national reports.5 This panel database, which greatly promoted the 
empirical study of the links between inequality and other economic variables, was 
updated and extended by the UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) (WIDER, 2008).6 The WIID database includes Gini coefficients, quintile and 
decile shares, and the income shares of the top 5% and bottom 5%. The information is 
drawn from very different sources, which raises comparability concerns.7 To provide 
guidance in the use of the database, ratings are given to the observations, based on 
the survey quality, the coverage, and the quality of the information provided by the 
original source. The SWIID database is an effort to identify reasonably comparable 
information in WIID (Solt, 2009).8 
                                                     
5 The Deininger and Squire dataset was preceded by several earlier collections by the United Nations 
agencies, the World Bank, ILO and others. See for example Paukert (1973), Jain (1975) and the 
references in Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). 
6 WIID was initially compiled over 1997-1999 for the UNU/WIDER-UNDP project "Rising Income 
Inequality and Poverty Reduction: Are They Compatible?" directed by Giovanni Andrea Cornia.  
7 Analyzing the Deininger and Squire dataset, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) conclude that “users could 
be seriously misled if they simply download the accept series (i.e., the “high quality” subset)”. Although 
WIID implies a significant improvement from the original DS dataset, a similar word of caution applies.    
8 SWIID should also be reviewed critically: in many cases it requires a case-by-case analysis, which is 
simply a sign that much effort is still needed in putting together comparable statistics. As it is based on 
secondary datasets, external problems are inadvertently incorporated. 
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The All the Ginis database, assembled also by Branko Milanovic, is a compilation and 
adaptation of Gini coefficients retrieved from five datasets: LIS, SEDLAC, WYD, the 
World Bank ECA database, and WIID. Besides gathering all the information in a single 
file, the All the Ginis database is useful as it provides information on the welfare 
concept and recipient unit to which the reported Gini refers, facilitating the 
comparisons.  
The Chartbook of Economic Inequality, assembled by Atkinson and Morelli (2012), 
presents a summary of evidence about changes in economic inequality 
(income/consumption, earnings and wealth) in the period from 1911 to 2010 for 25 
countries. The information drawn from household surveys for the seven countries in 
the developing world included in the database (Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa) starts in the 1950s.  
All the datasets mentioned above are based on data from national household surveys.9 
Even when they are the best available source of information for distributive analysis, 
household surveys are plagued with problems for international comparative studies, 
because, among other reasons, the questionnaires and the procedures to compute 
income/consumption variables differ among countries, and frequently also within a 
country over time.10 Some surveys inquire about income and others about 
consumption, some capture net income and some gross income, in some cases 
variables are reported on a weekly basis and in others on a monthly basis, items as the 
imputed rent for owner occupied housing are included in some surveys and ignored in 
others.11 Even in those projects that made explicit efforts to reduce these differences, 
comparability issues persist, as problems rooted in differences in questionnaires are 
difficult to be completely overcome. These limitations are well recognized in the 
literature. Chen and Ravallion (2012) state that “…there are problems that we cannot 
deal with. For example, it is known that differences in survey methods (such as 
questionnaire design) can create non-negligible differences in the estimates obtained 
for consumption or income”. In a survey of global income inequality, Anand and Segal 
(2008) share those concerns.  
There are some alternatives to reduce the comparability problems, although they all 
come at a price. Gallup conducts a survey in nearly all nations in the world with almost 
exactly the same questionnaire. The Gallup World Poll is particularly rich in self-
reported measures of quality of life, opinions, and perceptions, but it also includes 
basic questions on demographics, education, and employment, and a question on 
household income. In principle, the Gallup World Poll allows a distributive analysis in 
nearly all the countries in the world based on the same income question. The 
downside is that measurement errors may be very large when reported income is 
                                                     
9 The exception is the Chartbook of Economic Inequality, which uses a range of sources, including tax 
data, that in some cases allows the analysis to go back much further than with household survey data.  
10 Some of these issues are also addressed in chapter 12 of this Handbook. 
11 In addition, the typical problems of under-reporting and selective compliance are negligible in some 
cases and endemic in others. See Deaton (2003, 2005) and Korinek et al. (2006). 
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based only on one question and with sample sizes of just around 1000 observations 
per country.12  
The Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII) data set produced by the University 
of Texas Inequality Project is based on UTIP-UNIDO, a global data set that calculates 
industrial pay-inequality measures for 156 countries from 1963 to 2003, using the 
between-groups component of a Theil index, measured across industrial categories in 
the manufacturing sector (Galbraith and Kum, 2005). Specifically, EHII consists on 
estimates of gross household income inequality computed from an OLS regression 
between the Deininger and Squire (DS) inequality measures and the UTIP-UNIDO 
manufacturing pay-inequality measures.13 Although in principle the use of industrial 
pay information could lend some homogeneity into the comparisons, it should be 
stressed that since the underlying data do not refer to individuals and then have no 
distributive content, the methodology could be seen just as an extension of DS.  
 
3. Inequality: levels  
In this section we present results regarding the level of inequality in the developing 
countries, deferring to the next section the discussion of the trends. In most of the 
section we measure inequality computed over the distribution of household 
consumption per capita, using data from PovcalNet.14 Consumption is usually regarded 
as a better measure of current welfare than income on both theoretical and practical 
grounds, especially in developing countries (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). As it is usual in 
this literature, we frequently refer to income inequality, despite the fact that statistics 
are constructed over the distribution of consumption expenditures. 
As discussed above, this chapter is mainly focused on within-country inequality, so 
welfare disparities are measured among individuals living within national boundaries. 
Although globalization is increasingly raising global inequality concerns, inequality 
remains mainly a national matter. This view also leads us to mostly document 
unweighted statistics of inequality measures across countries, a practice that is 
consistent with the typical cross-country approach in the development literature. 
                                                     
12 Gasparini and Gluzmann (2012) compare basic statistics drawn from the Gallup Poll with those 
computed from the national household surveys of the LAC countries for year 2006, and conclude that in 
most countries statistics from the Gallup Poll, including income poverty and inequality, are roughly 
consistent with those from national household surveys. 
13 The regression typically includes controls for the source of information in the inequality data 
(income/expenditure, gross/net, and household/per capita measures) and for the share of 
manufacturing employment in total employment. 
14 The drawbacks of computing inequality in the distribution of consumption or income per capita to 
measure distributive justice have been widely acknowledged. Among other limitations, it is a one-
dimensional approach, it is focused on results not opportunities, it ignores the value of publicly provided 
goods such as education and health services, and it adopts a simple adjustment for demographics 
ignoring intra-household inequality, economies of scale and differences in needs (Ferreira and Ravallion, 
2009). However, extending inequality measurement to alleviate these limitations in a way that keeps 
international comparisons feasible has been proved difficult.  
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Weighting by population would imply an assessment of inequality in a region or in the 
world strongly affected by some highly-populated countries, such as China, India and 
Indonesia in Asia, or Brazil and Mexico in Latin America, and almost ignoring the 
situation in other less-populated nations. Having said that, since the decision of taking 
each political entity as a unit in the analysis is certainly debatable; we show some 
results using both unweighted and population-weighted statistics.15 
 
3.1. Inequality in the developing countries  
We start by comparing inequality levels across developing countries based on the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of household consumption per capita for year 2010, 
computed in PovcalNet mostly from household survey microdata. Other inequality 
measures are highly correlated with the Gini coefficient. For instance, in PovcalNet and 
WIID datasets the Pearson and Spearman correlations of the Gini and several extreme 
inequality measures (e.g. the 90/10 and 80/20 income-share ratios) exceed 0.9.  
PovcalNet includes information for the distribution of per capita consumption 
expenditures, except in almost all Latin American and a few Caribbean countries, for 
which income inequality statistics are reported. In the analysis that follows we adjust 
the income Gini coefficients in that region to reflect the gap between income and 
consumption inequality estimates. Specifically, we selected seven Latin American 
countries with household surveys that include reasonably good consumption and 
income data in several years:16 on average the ratio of the consumption/income Ginis 
is 0.861 (standard deviation of 0.046). We apply that coefficient to the 22 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries with income data to approximate their 
consumption Ginis.17 18 
In most cases the observations correspond to year 2010, or adjacent years. However, 
some countries are lacking a recent household survey (or it was dropped due to quality 
concerns). In fact, in 24 countries the survey used to estimate inequality in 2010 was 
carried out between 2000 and 2005, while in 6 cases (5 of them in the Caribbean) the 
observation corresponds to the 1990s. With that caveat in mind, the PovcalNet dataset 
has relatively recent distributive information for 82% of the countries in the 
developing world, representing 97% of its total population (see Table A.1 in the 
Appendix). The country coverage across regions is heterogeneous. In East Asia and 
Pacific PovcalNet includes 12 out of the 24 developing countries, which nonetheless 
                                                     
15 See some arguments on this debate in Bourguignon et al. (2004).  
16 The countries are Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. 
17 We decided to apply the same coefficient to all LAC countries after failing to find significant 
regularities between the ratio consumption/income Ginis and other observable variables for the seven 
countries in the sample. WDR (2006) reports consumption and income Ginis in four Latin American 
countries; the mean ratio of the Ginis is 0.81. The value is somewhat lower (0.77) for the eight non-LA 
countries in the sample.  
18 We also tried an additive adjustment, instead of a multiplicative one, with no significant changes in 
the results. 
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represent 96% of the total population of the area. The coverage in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia is almost complete, lacking information only for the small Kosovo. In LAC 
the coverage is complete in continental Latin America, but weak in the Caribbean. 
Anyway, countries with information represent 98% of the total population in LAC (the 
main missing country in terms of population is Cuba). The dataset in Middle East and 
North Africa does not include information for Lebanon and Libya, which represent only 
3% of the MENA population. In South Asia the only country missing is Afghanistan, 
while in Sub-Saharan Africa there is information for 42 out of the 47 countries, 
representing 95% of the population, although in some cases the information is rather 
old.     
Figure 1 displays the range of Gini coefficients for 122 countries around year 2010, 
ranking from the least unequal (Ukraine, 25.6) to the most unequal economy (South 
Africa, 63.1).19 The mean value is 39.8, while the median is 39.2. More than half of the 
observations are in the range [35, 45]. Only seven Eastern Europe countries have Ginis 
below 30, and five Sub-Saharan African countries have Ginis higher than 55. The 
population-weighted mean is less than one point lower than the simple mean (39.1), a 
result affected by the relatively low level of inequality in populous India and Indonesia 
(China has a Gini somewhat higher than the world mean). Figure 1 shows the position 
of some of the most populated countries: Brazil has high inequality levels, China and 
Russia intermediate values, and India and Indonesia relatively low levels in the context 
of the developing world.  
 
Figure 1 
Gini coefficients for the distribution of household consumption per capita 
Developing countries, 2010   
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: countries sorted by their Gini coefficients.  
                                                     
19 PovcalNet reports Ginis above 63.1 for Comoros and Seychelles, two small island countries in the 
Indian Ocean. However, the results are not well established. For instance, the reported Gini in 
Seychelles is 42.7 in 2000 and 65.8 in 2007, a highly implausible change in just seven years.  
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The variability of Gini coefficients across countries is large compared to the changes 
within countries over time, at least for the period for which we have more robust 
information (since the early 1980s). Li, Squire and Zou (1998) find in the Deininger and 
Squire dataset that 90% of the total variance in the Gini coefficient is explained by 
variation across countries, while only a small percentage is accounted by variation over 
time. From this observation Li et al. (1998) conclude that inequality should be mainly 
determined by factors which differ substantially across countries, but tend to be 
relatively stable within countries over time. We find a similar result in a panel of 
developing countries from 1981 to 2010 (PovcalNet data): 88.5% of the variance in 
that panel is accounted by variation across countries.  
The inequality rankings are relatively stable over time. The Spearman-rank correlation 
coefficient for the Ginis in 1981 and 2010 is 0.68, while it rises to 0.74 for 1990 and 
2010, both significant at 1%. The last decades witnessed enormous economic, social 
and political changes in the developing world, but, although the income distributions 
have been affected with various intensities, the world inequality ranking has not 
changed much, a fact that suggests the existence of some underlying factors that are 
stronger determinants of the level of inequality. 
In Figure 2 developing countries are grouped in regions. Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
geographic area that includes countries with the highest inequality levels, but it is also 
the region with the highest dispersion, possibly in part due to measurement errors 
(Table 2). Although eight out of the ten highest Gini coefficients belong to Sub-Saharan 
African countries, and the arithmetic mean of the Gini coefficient is the highest in the 
world, the median is lower than in Latin America.  
 
Figure 2 
Gini coefficients for the distribution of household consumption per capita 
Developing countries, 2010   
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: each bar represents a country in a given geographic region of the developing world.  
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Table 2 
Gini coefficients for the distribution of household consumption per capita 
Developing countries, 2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: unweighted statistics. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean has been typically pointed out as the most unequal 
region in the world. Deininger and Squire (1996), for instance, state that their dataset 
confirm the “familiar fact that inequality in Latin America is considerably higher than in 
the rest of the world”.20 This type of assessment however is usually made combining 
income Ginis for LAC with consumption Ginis for other regions, and/or ignoring Sub-
Saharan Africa. With the adjustment mentioned above to take the 
consumption/income gap into consideration (factor 0.861), we find that the mean Gini 
for LAC is 43.8, slightly lower than in SSA (44.4), but the median is higher (44.8 in LAC 
and 42.1 in SSA). To reach the result of a higher mean Gini in LAC than in SSA we would 
need an adjustment parameter higher than 0.92; such value is larger than what we 
estimated in all LA countries in the sample, except Mexico. 
The rest of the regions in the developing world have Ginis mostly below 40. The 
arithmetic mean is 38.1 in East Asia and Pacific, 36.0 in Middle East and North Africa, 
and 35.0 in South Asia. Inequality is likely to be higher in MENA, since several oil-
producing countries are excluded for being high-income economies (and also for lack 
of information).21 Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the region with the lowest 
inequality levels, with a mean Gini coefficient of 33.6. Interestingly, the dispersion 
measured by the coefficient of variation is higher than in the rest of the regions, 
except SSA.    
Almost all very highly unequal countries (Gini coefficients above 50) are in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Table 3). This region, however, has a similar share of countries in the high and 
middle categories. In contrast, in LAC most countries have high levels of inequality, 
                                                     
20 See also Lopez Calva and Lustig (2010) and Chen and Ravallion (2012). 
21 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates are in that group. Malta and Israel 
are also ignored for being developed and Lebanon and Libya are excluded for lack of information. 
 
Mean Median Coef. Var. Min. Max.
East Asia and Pacific 38.1 36.7 0.101 31.9 43.5
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 33.6 33.7 0.144 25.6 43.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 43.8 44.8 0.104 34.7 52.8
Middle East and North Africa 36.0 36.1 0.091 30.8 40.9
South Asia 35.0 36.3 0.081 30.0 38.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 44.4 42.1 0.175 33.3 63.1
Developing countries 39.8 39.2 0.181 25.6 63.1
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while in EAP, MENA and SA most countries are in the middle-inequality group. Only 
ECA has economies with low inequality (Gini coefficients below 30).  
 
Table 3 
Classification of countries by level of inequality and by region 
Developing countries, 2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: countries are classified according to the value of the Gini coefficient  
for the distribution of household consumption per capita. 
 
The All the Ginis dataset (ATG) includes Gini coefficients from LIS, SEDLAC, WYD, the 
World Bank ECA database and WIID. We selected consumption Ginis from ATG for year 
2005 or close, and applied a similar adjustment as described above for those countries 
in LAC with only income Ginis. The basic results are similar to the ones obtained with 
PovcalNet data. The linear correlation coefficient for the Gini between both data 
sources is 0.763, while the Spearman rank correlation is 0.771, both significant at 1%. 
The Gini coefficients in ATG go from 23.1 (Czech Republic) to 62.9 (Comoros). The 
mean and median coincide in 40.1. Again, more than half of the observations are in the 
range [35, 45]. Only several Eastern European countries have Ginis below 30, while 
only four Sub-Saharan African countries have Ginis higher than 55.  
The evidence on inequality levels in the developing world drawn from WIID is similar. 
For instance, based on a sample of income Ginis for around 2005, Gasparini et al. 
(2013) find that the mean Gini for the six Sub-Saharan African countries in the dataset 
is 56.5, followed by Latin America (52.9), Asia (44.7) and Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (34.7).22 The linear correlation coefficient for year 2005 for the Gini coefficient in 
PovcalNet and WIID is 0.871, and the Spearman coefficient is 0.820. 
The Luxembourg Income Study database (see chapter 9 of this volume) covers 36 
countries, including 6 in Latin America, which occupy the top places in all the income 
inequality rankings.23 The mean Gini for the Eastern European countries in LIS is 
slightly higher than the mean for the high-income economies. Data from the World 
Development Indicators also suggest that inequality in the developing world is 
                                                     
22 The OECD high-income countries rank as the least unequal in the world with a mean income Gini of 
32.8. 
23 The LA Ginis go from 50.6 in Colombia to 43.9 in Uruguay; the most unequal non-LA country is Russia 
with a value of 40.8, while the rest of the countries in LIS go from 37 (USA) to 22.8 (Denmark). 
Very high High Middle Low Total
[50-70] [40-50) [30-40) [20-30)
East Asia and Pacific 0 3 8 0 11
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0 5 16 7 28
Latin America and the Caribbean 2 17 6 0 25
Middle East and North Africa 0 1 10 0 11
South Asia 0 0 7 0 7
Sub-Saharan Africa 10 14 16 0 40
Total 12 40 63 7 122
Inequality
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significantly higher than in the OECD high-income countries. The mean income Gini for 
the latter group is 32.2, which is lower than in any other region in the world.  
The EHII database confirms the high inequality levels of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America, but perhaps surprisingly, it records similar levels in South Asia and Middle 
East and North Africa (Gini of around 47).24 According to this dataset inequality is 
relatively lower in East Asia and Pacific and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The 
estimated level of the Gini coefficient is substantially lower in the developed 
economies; the mean is equal to 36.5.25 The Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
coefficient between EHII and PovcalNet Ginis is 0.642 (0.603), lower than the resulting 
value when comparing PovcalNet with WIID or ATG, but still significant at 1%. 
Most international databases do not provide confidence intervals for the point 
estimates of the distributive measures, making impossible the assessment of the 
statistical significance of the differences in inequality among countries. However, given 
that the indicators are calculated from large national household surveys, the 
confidence intervals are typically relatively narrow. SEDLAC provides the confidence 
intervals for all the Gini coefficients in Latin America: for instance, the 95% confidence 
interval for the income Gini was [43.9, 44.7] in Argentina 2010, [53.5, 54.0] in Brazil 
2009; and [47.0, 47.9] in Mexico 2010. Differences in the point estimates of more than 
1 Gini point are always statistically significant (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 
Gini coefficient and confidence intervals (95%) 
Distribution of household income per capita 
Latin American countries, 2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank). 
 
                                                     
24 See also Galbraith and Kum (2005). 
25 This mean excludes the oil-rich Arab countries. When including these countries in the sample the 
mean Gini jumps to 39.  
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3.2. Inequality beyond the Gini coefficient  
The international databases usually allow a closer look at the distributions in the world 
beyond a single parameter, such as the Gini coefficient. Table 4 reports some basic 
statistics of the decile shares in 120 countries around 2010.26 On average (unweighted) 
the poorest 10% of the population in a country accrues 2.6% of total consumption 
reported in the survey: that share climbs to 31.5% for the top 10%. In a typical 
developing country the aggregate consumption of the poorest 60% of the population is 
similar than the consumption of the top 10%.  
It is interesting to notice that the coefficient of variation of the decile consumption 
shares across countries is decreasing up to the top decile, when it strongly rises: 
countries in the world seem substantially different in the consumption share of the 
poor and the rich, but not in the share of the middle strata, in particular the upper-
middle strata.27  
 
Table 4 
Deciles shares, distribution of household consumption per capita 
Developing countries, 2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: unweighted statistics. 
 
The aggregate consumption share of deciles 5 to 9 is on average around 50%, and it is 
very stable across countries. Palma (2011) has labeled this phenomenon the 
homogeneous middle. Variability across countries is actually smaller in the upper-
middle deciles (deciles 7 to 9). The proportion of total consumption accruing to that 
group is quite similar in all geographic regions of the world: it ranges from 35.9% in 
SSA to 37.3% in ECA. The main difference across regions lies in the share of the bottom 
60% compared to those in the upper 10%. For example, while the share of deciles 7 to 
                                                     
26 Again, figures for Latin American and a few Caribbean countries are estimated based on the 
comparison of income and consumption microdata of seven countries in that region.  
27 This observation could be simply linked to the fact that the cumulative distribution functions of two 
income distributions most often cross around the middle (e.g. in a mean preserving spread) rather than 
at the ends of the distributions.  
Deciles Mean Std. Dev. Coef.Var. Min. Max.
1 2.6 0.81 0.31 1.0 4.4
2 3.8 0.86 0.23 1.5 5.8
3 4.8 0.90 0.19 2.0 6.8
4 5.8 0.92 0.16 2.6 7.8
5 6.8 0.92 0.13 3.5 8.8
6 8.1 0.87 0.11 4.7 9.9
7 9.6 0.80 0.08 6.6 11.0
8 11.7 0.65 0.06 9.0 12.7
9 15.3 0.84 0.05 12.7 17.6
10 31.5 6.12 0.19 19.5 51.7
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9 in total consumption is almost the same in ECA (37.3%) and LAC (37.1%), the share of 
the bottom 60% is more than 7 points higher in the former (36.4% and 29.1%, 
respectively).  
The correlation coefficients for the decile shares in total consumption provide 
information about the structure of the distributions across countries (Table 5). In a 
cross-country perspective, gains are highly positively correlated in the first 8 deciles; 
on the other hand, for decile 10 correlations are all negative and large, except with 
decile 9, for which the correlation is non-significant. Gains in the participation of the 
richest 10% are tightly linked to losses in the share of the poorest 80% of the 
population. The table suggests that when we move up in the ladder of countries 
according to the share of the bottom deciles, we expect to see gains in the lowest 
strata obtained mostly against the share of the upper 20% of the population (and not 
for instance against the middle strata, and in alliance with the most affluent).  
 
Table 5 
Correlation coefficients across countries of decile consumption shares  
Developing countries, 2010 
  
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
*=significant at 1%.  
 
3.3. Inequality in the Gallup World Poll  
The Gallup World Poll provides new evidence on the international comparisons of 
income inequality, as it includes identical income and demographic questions applied 
to national samples in 132 countries. Of course, the reliability of the national inequality 
estimates in Gallup is lower than those obtained with household surveys, since only 
one income question is used to approximate well-being, and the sample sizes are 
considerably smaller. However, Gluzmann (2012) finds that the correlation coefficient 
between the Gini coefficients computed with Gallup microdata and those reported in 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) that are based on per capita income is high 
(0.85).28 International surveys with similar questionnaires across countries, such as the 
Gallup World Poll, could hardly be a substitute for household surveys as the main 
                                                     
28 Interestingly, the relationship between the income Ginis in Gallup and the consumption Ginis in WDI is 
much weaker; the linear correlation coefficient is 0.21, non-significant at 10%. 
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
d1 1
d2 0.9355* 1
d3 0.8930* 0.9883* 1
d4 0.8421* 0.9624* 0.9910* 1
d5 0.8042* 0.9273* 0.9647* 0.9787* 1
d6 0.7336* 0.8739* 0.9291* 0.9623* 0.9847* 1
d7 0.6310* 0.7734* 0.8436* 0.8950* 0.9378* 0.9736* 1
d8 0.3127* 0.4711* 0.5624* 0.6446* 0.7253* 0.8085* 0.8982* 1
d9 -0.5793* -0.4905* -0.4112* -0.3258* -0.2389* -0.1232 0.0527 0.4390* 1
d10 -0.7844* -0.9032* -0.9452* -0.9689* -0.9844* -0.9891* -0.9650* -0.7962* 0.118 1
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source for distributive analysis at the country level, but they may have a great 
potential for international comparisons of social variables. Future improvements in the 
quality of these surveys could turn them into a very valuable source for comparative 
international research.   
Gasparini and Gluzmann (2012) use microdata from the Gallup World Poll 2006 to 
compute inequality in each region of the world. According to the unweighted mean of 
the national income Gini coefficients, Latin America is the most unequal region in the 
world (excluding Africa, which is not in the sample). The mean Gini in Latin America is 
49.9, slightly larger than in South Asia (48.9), and Eastern Asia and Pacific (47.1). 
Countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (41.8), North America (39.2) and 
especially Western Europe (34.0) are the least unequal. Alternatively, regional 
inequality can be measured by considering each region as a single unit, and computing 
inequality among all individuals in that unit, after translating their incomes to a 
common currency - a concept usually labeled global inequality (see chapter 12 of this 
Handbook). The global Gini in Latin America is 52.5, a value higher than in Western 
Europe (40.2), North America (43.8) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (49.8), but 
lower than in South Asia (53.2) and Eastern Asia and Pacific (59.4). The change in the 
rankings between the two concepts of inequality is driven by the differences across 
regions in the heterogeneity among countries in terms of mean income. Gasparini and 
Gluzmann (2012) report that the between component in a Theil decomposition 
accounts for 8% of total regional inequality in Latin America and 32.4% in East Asia and 
Pacific.  
 
3.4. Top incomes 
Until the recent developments in the literature of top incomes from tax records 
(Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010; see also chapter 16 in this volume), inequality 
research has been mostly based on household surveys, which suffer from several 
limitations when focusing on the upper end of the distribution. Household surveys are 
all but ideal for studying top shares: the rich are usually missing from surveys, either 
for sampling reasons or because they refuse to cooperate with the time-consuming 
task of completing or answering to a long form. Because extreme observations are 
sometimes regarded as data “contamination”, the rich may be intentionally excluded 
or top coded so as to minimize bias problems generated by presumably less-reliable 
outliers, or to preserve anonymity. Additionally, survey data present severe under-
reporting at the top: the richest individuals are more reluctant to disclose their 
incomes, or have diversified portfolios with income flows that are difficult to value. 
Székely and Hilgert (1999) look at surveys from eighteen Latin American household 
surveys and confirm that the ten highest incomes reported are often not much larger 
than the salary of an average manager in the given country at the time of the survey. 
In general, the profile of the average individual in the top 10% of the distribution is 
closer to the prototype of highly educated professionals earning labor incomes, rather 
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than capital owners. On this specific issue, the quality of statistical information coming 
from surveys has not improved in the last years. Consequently, the inequality that we 
are able to measure with household surveys can be severely affected, regarding both 
levels and dynamics, in those cases or periods in which an important part of the story 
takes place at the top. 
Tax and register data are being increasingly preferred over surveys in studying 
distributive issues at the top. In fact, under certain conditions registry data can provide 
valuable information to improve survey-based estimates. Typically, incomes reported 
to the surveys are checked against the registers, or incomes are directly taken from 
administrative sources for the individuals in the sample. Even if the combination of 
survey and administrative data can be seen as an improvement, there remains the 
issue of the sampling framework for the top of the distribution.29 In any case, statistics 
offices in the developing world are not exploiting register data to complement surveys 
yet. 
The use of tax statistics is not without drawbacks. First, since only a fraction of the 
population files a tax return, studies using tax data are restricted to measuring top 
shares, which are silent about changes in the lower and middle part of the distribution. 
Second, tax data are collected as part of an administrative process and do not seek to 
address research needs; both income and tax units are defined by the tax laws and 
vary considerably across time and countries. Third and most important, estimates are 
affected by tax avoidance and tax evasion; the rich, in particular, have a strong 
incentive to understate their taxable incomes. These elements, which are common to 
all countries, become critical in the developing world, characterized by tax systems 
with low enforcement and multiple legal ways to avoid the tax.30 
A number of researchers have addressed the differences in the ability of tax and 
survey data to represent income inequality, trying to reconcile the evidence using the 
two sources (see Alvaredo, 2011; Burkhauser et al., 2012 for the US). Unfortunately, at 
the moment of writing only a few developing countries have made available microdata 
from the income tax (namely Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay). Alvaredo and Londoño 
(2013), and Alvaredo and Cano (forthcoming) show that, in contrast to survey-based 
results, high-income individuals are, in essence, rentiers and capital owners. This 
feature differs from the pattern found in several developed countries in recent 
decades, where it has been shown that the large increase in the share of income going 
                                                     
29 If high-income individuals are not properly identified in the sample framework, comparing the 
incomes reported to the surveys against those in the registers one by one is only a partial improvement. 
In the UK, for example, the ONS scales up the surveys’ incomes so that the surveys’ averages match the 
average income in tax data. 
30 The reasons for which the rich and wealthy may be particularly dissuaded from disclosing their 
fortunes and incomes to authorities in the developing world may go beyond tax concerns, lest the 
information revealed fall into the wrong hands. Alvaredo and Londoño (2013) report that in Colombia, 
until recently plagued by high insecurity, anecdotal evidence suggests that during the intense political 
violence of the 1990s leaked personal tax returns were used by criminal groups to target victims and 
kidnap for ransom. 
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to the top groups has been mainly due to spectacular increases in executive 
compensation and high salaries, and to a lesser extent to a partial restoration of capital 
incomes. While the working rich have joined capital owners at the top of the income 
hierarchy in the United States and other English-speaking countries, Colombia and 
Ecuador remain more traditional societies where the top income recipients are still the 
owners of the capital stock.  
Results, even if fragmentary, confirm that incomes reported to the tax authorities are 
considerably higher than those captured by the surveys at the top. For instance, the 
share of income accrued by the top 1% in Argentina in 2007 was 8.8% using household 
survey data (PovcalNet) and 13.4% using income tax data (WTID). In Uruguay 2010 the 
shares were 8.2% and 14.3%, and in Colombia 2010 13.9% and 20.4%, respectively.  
Therefore, synthetic measures of inequality, if presented in an isolated way, hide 
survey-based shares that may be unrealistically low. In this sense, it could be a good 
practice to systematically show the inequality indexes together with the shares of the 
underlying top percentiles to let users judge the quality of the estimates.31 
A natural question, which has received much attention lately, is the extent to which tax 
data can complement household surveys in examining the level of inequality in 
developing countries. Alvaredo and Londoño (2013) compare the Colombian 
household survey with the tax micro-data over the years 2007-2010. The total 
household income from the survey is 60-65% of the NAS measure of disposable 
income.32 Such gap cannot be seen as an accurate measure of the total missing income 
in household surveys, because both sources are different, but a partial explanation 
may well be at the top of the distribution. As a simple exercise, these authors replace 
all the incomes above the percentile 99 in the survey with those from tax data (net of 
taxes and social security contributions to render both sources comparable), under the 
assumption that the top 1% is poorly captured in the survey. Two elements are worth 
mentioning. First, the gap between the NAS figure and the survey’s incomes of the 
bottom 99% plus the net-of-tax incomes from tax data above the percentile 99 goes 
down from 35-40% to 20-25%. Second, the Gini coefficient of individual incomes goes 
up from 55 to 61 in 2010.33 
These findings challenge the general skepticism regarding the use of tax data from 
developing countries to study inequality. Such estimates should be regarded as a lower 
bound, to take into account the effects of evasion and under reporting. Nevertheless, 
                                                     
31 Povcalnet follows this practice by providing estimates of the Lorenz curve, with varying degrees of 
detail depending on the country. 
32 The National Accounts-based measure of household disposable income has been defined as: balance 
of households’ primary incomes + social benefits other than social transfers in kind − employers’ actual 
social contributions − imputed social contributions − attributed property income of insurance 
policyholders − imputed rentals for owner occupied housing − fixed capital consumption – employees’ 
social security contributions – taxes on income and wealth paid by households. 
33 These results are still approximations, as defining individual actual incomes from the Colombian tax 
records is not always straightforward. 
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they show that incomes reported to tax authorities can be a valuable source of 
information, under certain conditions that require a case-by-case analysis. 
 
3.5. Inequality and development  
Is the level of inequality in a country associated to its development stage? In this 
section we take advantage of a cross-section of national Gini coefficients for year 2010 
to take a look at this issue. Of course, this topic is related to the long-lasting debate 
initiated with the seminal contributions by Lewis (1954) and Kuznets (1955), who 
argued that the process of industrialization would imply an inverse U pattern for 
inequality. However, the empirical test for the Kuznets curve requires time-series or 
panel data, and not just a cross-section, since it is a hypothesis about the dynamics of 
an economy over its development process. The causal relationship between 
development and inequality is the subject of a large literature that has to face 
numerous empirical challenges, and hence it is far from settled (see Anand and 
Kanbur, 1993; Fields, 2002; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Dominics et al., 2008; and 
Voitchovsky, 2009 for assessments). In this section we simply document the empirical 
relationship between these two variables across countries in a recent point in time 
without exploring the difficult issue of causality.   
The first panel in Figure 4 plots the Gini coefficient for the distribution of consumption 
per capita against per capita gross national income (GNI).34 The figure seems to reveal 
a decreasing relationship between inequality and development. The linear correlation 
coefficient between the Gini coefficient and per capita GNI is -0.56 (statistically 
significant at the 1% level). An inverse-U shape shows up in the second panel of Figure 
4, when per capita GNI is presented in logs. However, the increasing segment of the 
curve covers only very poor Sub-Saharan African countries. The relationship Gini-GNI is 
decreasing in the range of GNI of most countries in the world.  
                                                     
34 The Gini for the developed countries is computed over the distribution of income per capita, and not 
consumption per capita, a fact that probably underestimates the slope of the curve.  
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Figure 4 
Inequality and development  
Per capita gross national income (GNI) and Gini coefficient, 2010 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on WDI and PovcalNet (2013). 
 
The results of the regressions in Table 6 and the Lind and Mehlum (2010) test confirm 
an inverse U shape for the relationship between the Gini coefficient and log GNI per 
capita in a cross-section of countries.35 The result seems also valid, although becomes 
considerable weaker, when restricting the sample to developing economies. It should 
be stressed that the turning points implicit in the regressions correspond to around 
US$ 1800, a value that is lower than the per capita GNI of most developing countries, 
except for some economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.36 The inclusion of regional dummies 
reveals that East Asian, and especially Latin American and Sub-Saharan African 
                                                     
35 It is also confirmed estimating GDP with the Atlas method, and using the All the Ginis database.  
36 Larger measurement errors in the SSA countries may also account for the increasing segment of the 
curve. Also, it is possible that the econometric model is picking up the concavity of the relationship at 
higher income levels.  
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countries are particularly unequal, even when controlling for their levels of economic 
development.37 
 
Table 6 
Regressions of Gini coefficient on log GNI per capita and regional dummies 
 
Note: robust cluster standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Omitted category: Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
Lind and Mehlum test: H0: monotone or U shape; H1: inverse U shape. 
 
 
4. Inequality: trends  
In this section we report the recent trends in income inequality in the developing 
countries. We start laying out the general patterns, and then deep into the evidence 
for each region. Although most of the section deals with relative inequality, we devote 
a section to explore patterns for absolute inequality, and a section to document 
aggregate welfare changes.38 We end with a brief summary of the methodologies and 
main issues in the debate on inequality determinants in the developing world. 
 
                                                     
37 The Latin American “excess inequality” is documented in Londoño and Székely (2000); Gasparini, 
Cruces and Tornarolli (2011), and others.  
38 While relative inequality measures are scale invariant, absolute measures are translation invariant. 
Accordingly, a general increase of x% in all incomes in the population will leave relative inequality 
unchanged, but imply an increase in absolute inequality. 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
log GNIpc 24.24 24.44 18.01 26.54
(9.52)** (4.48)*** (8.23)* (6.58)**
log GNIpc squared -1.606 -1.409 -1.202 -1.541
(0.552)** (0.34)*** (0.53)* (0.48)**
Developed countries -1.416
(2.76)
East Asia & Pacific 7.352 7.170
(1.43)*** (1.62)***
Latin America & Caribbean 10.238 10.157
(0.53)*** (0.62)***
Middle East & North Africa 2.334 2.144
(1.28) (1.48)
South Asia 1.705 1.515
(1.79) (1.97)
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.749 13.660
(2.33)*** (2.34)***
Constant -49.34 -72.10 -61.67 -80.27
(38.69) (13.17)*** (28.64)** (20.06)**
Observations 146 146 121 121
R-squared 0.31 0.58 0.07 0.45
Lind and Mehlum test  for inverse U shape
| t  | 2.72 2.31 1.35 2.0
p -value 0.004 0.011 0.089 0.024
All countries Only developing countries
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4.1. General changes  
The available evidence suggests that on average the levels of national income 
inequality in the developing world increased in the 1980s and 1990s, and declined in 
the 2000s. Using data from PovcalNet, the mean Gini for the distribution of per capita 
consumption expenditures increased from 37.2 in 1981 to 39.4 in 2010 (Figure 5). 39 
The mean was basically unchanged between 1981 and 1987,40 then increased more 
than three points to reach a value of 40.5 in 1999, and from 2002 it started to fall, 
although slowly (from 40.6 in 2002 to 39.4 in 2010).41  
 
Figure 5 
Gini coefficient 
Unweighted mean for developing countries, 1981-2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: the national Gini coefficients are computed over the distribution of household consumption per 
capita.  
 
Figure 6 adds to the picture the changes at different percentiles of the distribution of 
national Ginis. The figure makes clear that on average the changes in the last decades 
have not been large compared to the range over which the Gini varies across 
                                                     
39 In order to compute changes we discard countries in PovcalNet with less than four observations over 
the period 1981-2010, or with observations concentrated in a narrow time-period. The sample we use 
for the calculations on trends include 76 countries that represent 88% of the developing world 
population. In order to build a sample in which the country composition is held constant in a few cases 
Gini coefficients are imputed assuming constant inequality. Income Ginis in LAC are adjusted as 
explained in the previous section.  
40 This result is in part driven by the lack of information on changes in inequality over this period for 
several countries in the developing world. See below.  
41 The assessment of the economic salience of inequality changes over time is controversial as it involves 
both issues regarding the accuracy of the data, and considerations on the purpose for which the 
inequality statistics are used. In the context of the OECD countries Atkinson and Marlier (2010) propose 
applying a 2 percentage points criterion to assess the salience of the change in the Gini. On this basis, 
the increase in inequality in the developing world from 1981 to 2010 is just salient. 
33
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countries.42 The picture also reveals that the growth in the mean Gini in the late 1980s 
and 1990s was mainly due to the substantial increase in the low-inequality countries, 
in particular Eastern Europe and Central Asia economies after the fall of communism, 
and also some Asian economies in the early stage of economic take-off. Instead, the 
fall in the 2000s was widespread, although more intense in those countries above the 
median, such as those in Latin America. This observation suggests convergence in the 
levels of inequality in the developing economies. In fact, the standard deviation for the 
distribution of Gini coefficients substantially fell over time: 11.2 in 1981, 10.1 in 1990, 
7.4 in 1999 and 7.2 in 2010. Countries in the developing world are still very different in 
terms of income inequality but differences have become considerably smaller over the 
last three decades (more on convergence below).  
 
Figure 6 
Distribution of Gini coefficients 
Unweighted statistics for developing countries, 1981-2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: the national Gini coefficients are computed over the distribution of household consumption per 
capita.  
 
A closer inspection of the data reveals that the result of a stable mean Gini in most of 
the 1980s is driven by the lack of information for several countries, and by a 
substantial heterogeneity in the changes of those with information (Table 7).43 The 
strong rise in the mean Gini in the 1990s is associated to a large proportion of 
countries with growing inequality in a framework of much improved information. The 
tide seems to have turned in the 2000s, when most of the countries in the sample 
                                                     
42 This observation does not imply that changes were of little social relevance: an increase in inequality 
in a given country could be small in relation to the difference with other countries, but still a major 
cause of concern.   
43 We classify countries in groups according to whether the Gini went up or down by more or less than 
2.5% in a period. A change of 2.5% applied to the mean Gini in the developing world - which is around 
40- represents 1 Gini point. A change of 1 point in the Gini coefficient is typically statistically significant, 
given the sample sizes of the national household surveys.  
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2010
percentile 10%
percentile 90%
percentile 25%
percentile 75%
median
mean
Alvaredo-Gasparini 
 25 
experienced a fall in inequality. But even in this decade of widespread social 
improvement, the country performances in terms of inequality reduction were quite 
heterogeneous. In fact, in 20% of the economies of the developing world the Gini 
coefficient increased between 2002 and 2010, while in 15% of the countries the 
changes were smaller than 2.5%. 
 
Table 7 
Proportion of countries classified in groups according  
to the change in the Gini coefficient 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: “Fall” includes countries where the Gini fell more than 2.5% in the period, “Increase” include 
countries where the Gini rose more than 2.5%, “No change” includes countries where the Gini changed 
less than 2.5%, “No information” includes countries without two independent observations in each 
period.    
 
We find that the bulk of the countries in the sample (62%) experienced a change in the 
pattern of inequality around the turn of the century, from non-falling to decreasing 
inequality, while only a few experienced a pattern of continuous increasing (15%) or 
decreasing (12%) disparities. In fact, an inverse-U shape for the inequality pattern is 
observed for many economies (45% of the sample), a fact that could be consistent with 
the Kuznets story of economic growth for countries located close to the curve turning 
point. However, we fail to find any significant correlation between the type of the 
inequality pattern and different measures of development and growth. The inverse-U 
pattern in the period 1981-2010 appears to have been common to a wide range of 
economies.  
The growth in the population-weighted mean of the Gini coefficient across developing 
countries was stronger than the increase in the unweighted mean (Figure 7). While the 
latter increased 2.2 points in the period 1981-2010, the former jumped 7.5 points. The 
gap between the two means shrunk from 5.4 points in the early 1980s to almost zero 
in the late 2000s. This pattern is mainly accounted by the dramatic surge in income 
inequality in China over the period. Interestingly, the fall in the unweighted mean Gini 
in the 2000s does not show up in the weighted mean: although the Gini coefficient for 
a typical developing country significantly decreased in the 2000s, the national Gini for 
a typical person in the developing world did not fall.  
 
 
 
 
1981-1990 1990-2002 2002-2010
Fall 14.7 22.7 65.3
No change 21.3 16.0 14.7
Increase 34.7 60.0 20.0
No information 29.3 1.3 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Alvaredo-Gasparini 
 26 
Figure 7 
Gini coefficient 
Weighted and unweighted means  
Developing countries, 1981-2010 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: the Gini coefficients are computed over the distribution of household consumption per capita.  
 
In the rest of this section we go beyond the Gini coefficient and track changes along 
the distribution. In Figure 8 each point in a growth-incidence curve (GIC) indicates the 
unweighted mean across countries in the annual rate of growth of real consumption 
per capita (in PPP US$) for a given decile of the national distributions.44 There is a stark 
contrast in the GIC corresponding to the 1990s and the 2000s. The first one is clearly 
increasing, suggesting growing inequalities, while the second is decreasing (and 
flatter), indicating a fall in well-being disparities in the 2000s. On average, in that 
decade consumption per capita grew by more than annual 4% in the three bottom 
deciles of the national distributions and by 3% in the top decile.  
 
                                                     
44 The GIC depicted in Figure 8 is not the world growth-incidence curve, where for instance decile 1 
would include the poorest 10% of the world population. 
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2010
unweighted
weighted
Alvaredo-Gasparini 
 27 
Figure 8 
Growth-incidence curves 
Annualized growth rate in consumption per capita by decile 
Unweighted mean for developing countries  
  
Source: own estimates based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: annual change in consumption per capita (PPP US$). 1990s=1990-2002, 2000s=2002-2010.  
 
Naturally, the contrast between decades is also evident when looking at income 
shares. The results are summarized in Figure 9: while the share of the bottom 60% fell 
2 points in the 1990s and increased 0.9 points in the 2000s, the performance of the top 
10% was almost the exact mirror. The share of the “middle” (deciles 7 to 9) has 
remained quite stable over the two last decades (36.9 in 1990, 36.5 in 1999 and 36.6 in 
2010). This stratum seems not only quite homogeneous across countries but also over 
time (Palma, 2011).  
 
Figure 9 
Decile shares  
Unweighted mean for developing countries, 1990-2010  
 
Source: own estimates based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: the decile shares are computed over the distribution of household consumption per capita.  
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4.2. Changes by region  
Changes in inequality have been heterogeneous across the six geographical regions of 
the developing world (Figure 10).45 The mean Gini coefficient in Latin America 
increased more than two points in the 1990s, and then dropped in the 2000s by a 
larger amount. The data reveals almost no change in inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa 
over the two last decades and some decline in the five MENA countries included in the 
sample. Instead, the Gini coefficient increased more than two points in Asia, and more 
than six points in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Figure 10 suggests again some 
pattern toward convergence: the gaps in inequality among regions in the developing 
world are smaller now than two decades ago. For instance, while the gap in the Gini 
coefficient between Latin America and ECA was 18 points in the early 1990s, it shrank 
to 11 points in the late 2000s.  
 
Figure 10 
Gini coefficients 
Unweighted means by region, 1990-2010 
 
Source: own estimates based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: the Gini coefficients are computed over the distribution of household consumption per capita.  
 
In all the regions the share of countries with falling inequality rose in the 2000s, as 
compared to the 1990s. The two most remarkable changes in the pattern occurred in 
Latin America, and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. While the Gini went down in 
26% of the LA economies in the 1990s, that share increased to 95% in the 2000s. In 
ECA while the growth in inequality was generalized in the 1990s, more than half of the 
countries experienced reductions in the 2000s.   
                                                     
45 We prefer not to report the regional patterns before 1990 since the number of observations is small in 
several regions. The numbers of countries by region in the sample we use to assess inequality trends 
are: 8 in EAP, 20 in ECA, 19 in LAC (all in Latin America, none from the Caribbean), 5 in MENA, 4 in SA 
and 20 in SSA.  
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Using data from PovcalNet, Chen and Ravallion (2012) report changes in the within 
component of the global mean-log deviation between 1981 and 2008. This within 
component is a population-weighted measure of the national inequalities. They find 
substantial increases in East Asia and Pacific (from 0.125 to 0.256) and Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (from 0.128 to 0.225), smaller increases in South Asia (from 0.156 to 
0.181), Latin America and the Caribbean (from 0.541 to 0.561) and sub-Saharan Africa 
(from 0.338 to 0.347) and a fall in MENA (from 0.256 to 0.215). Bastagli et al. (2012) 
report similar patterns using data from PovcalNet, SEDLAC and LIS. 
The picture of national inequalities in the developing world is similar when using other 
databases. For instance, the unweighted mean Gini in the All the Ginis database 
assembled by Milanovic grew from 36.2 in 1990 to 40.7 in 1999 and then dropped to 
39.7 by 2005. While in the 1990s inequality rose in 63% of the economies in the ATG 
database, that share dropped to 35% in the 2000s. The recorded increase in the 1990s 
was generalized across regions, but especially intense in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (9 Gini points), while the fall in the 2000s was larger in MENA and Latin America. 
Cornia and Kiiski (2001), Cornia (2011) and Dhongde and Miao (2013) document 
similar results using WIID data. We find that the linear (rank) correlation coefficient for 
the change in the Gini coefficient between 1990 and 2005 recorded in PovcalNet and 
WIID is 0.776 (0.868), significant at 1%. The corresponding values for the comparison 
between PovcalNet and ATG are 0.721 and 0.765.   
The evidence drawn from the EHII database is also roughly consistent with the 
patterns discussed above. The mean Gini for the developing world remained almost 
unchanged in the 1980s, increased in the 1990s from 42.5 in 1990 to 47.0 in 1999, and 
dropped to 46.5 in 2002 (the latest available date).46 While in 62% of the countries 
inequality increased in the early 1990s, that share dropped to 55% between 1993 and 
1999, and to 49% between 1999 and 2002. The regional patterns are roughly 
consistent with those described above. The main difference is that EHII reveals a 
dramatic increase in inequality in the Middle East and North Africa (7 Gini points) that 
is not present in the evidence drawn from household surveys.  
In the rest of this section we briefly review the literature on inequality changes in each 
geographic region of the developing world, while we take a closer look to the story of 
some particular cases: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa.  
 
East Asia and Pacific 
The inequality patterns in East Asia and Pacific can be traced based on information 
from only 8 out of the 24 countries in the region, which nonetheless represent 96% of 
its total population. This set includes Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.  There is scattered evidence for Fiji, Micronesia, 
Mongolia and Timor-Leste, while information is either lacking or too scarce for 
                                                     
46 These estimates are computed dropping countries with few observations in the period.   
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American Samoa, Kiribati, Korea, Dem. Rep., Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.  
The slightly increasing pattern showed in Figure 10 for the unweighted mean of the 
consumption Gini in EAP hides important differences across countries (ADB, 2012; 
Chusseau and Hellier, 2012; Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Sharma et al., 2011; Solt, 2009; 
Zin, 2005). Consumption inequality increased in most economies in the region during 
the 1990s, with the exception of Thailand and Malaysia. The increase was particularly 
strong in China, where the consumption Gini climbed around 7 points in that decade. 
The performance in the 2000s was more heterogeneous: inequality continued 
increasing in China, Lao PDR and Indonesia, and also went up in Malaysia, while there 
is evidence pointing to a fall in consumption inequality in Cambodia, Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam.  
Overall, considering the two decades, EAP combines countries with systematic 
increases in inequality (China, Indonesia, Lao PDR), several cases in which inequality 
had a cyclical pattern, ending in 2010 at similar levels than in 1990 (Cambodia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam), and only one successful story of consistent 
reduction in consumption inequality: Thailand, for which the estimated reduction in 
the Gini coefficient exceeded five points; from 45.3 to 39.4 over the last two decades. 
Universal social policies, including basic education and health, have been stressed by 
many authors as significant drivers of that fall (Jomo and Baudot 2007). 
Probably the most striking phenomenon regarding inequality in EAP was the strong 
rise that took place in the two most populous countries of the region, China and 
Indonesia: the Gini coefficient went up around five points in Indonesia and more than 
ten points in China over the last two decades. Such dynamics happened in a context of 
high growth and falling poverty, most notably in China. Sharma et al. (2011) summarize 
the main factors behind these changes: (i) the realignment of activity away from 
agriculture and towards industry and services; (ii) the skill premium increase due to the 
unmatched growing demand for skills, and even the emigration of skilled workers; (iii) 
increasing inequalities in educational attainment in secondary and tertiary schooling; 
and (iv) a lack of infrastructure linking urban areas with rural areas and other barriers 
to labor mobility.  
 
China  
Since 1978, when China started the pro-market reforms, GDP has increased at an 
average rate close to 10 per cent, and household per capita income has grown more 
than 7 per cent per year. Such remarkable economic transformation has been 
accompanied by important changes in inequality and poverty. China is a successful 
story of reduction in absolute poverty (World Bank, 2009; Ravallion and Chen, 2007, 
2008; Minoiu and Reddy, 2008). However, it is argued that it will be harder for China to 
maintain its past rate of progress against absolute poverty without addressing the 
problem of rising inequality. 
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The increase in income inequality in China over the last three decades has been widely 
documented. Ravallion and Chen (2007) and World Bank (2009) show that income 
inequality rose from the mid-1980s through 1994, dipping a bit in the late 1990s, and 
then edging upward thereafter. Li et al. (2013), among others, document the increase 
in the 2000s, a pattern explained by the widening of the rural-urban income gap, and 
the increase in income from property and assets, driven by the development of urban 
residential real-estate markets, the expansion of stock and capital markets, the growth 
of private enterprises, and other property rights.  
A significant share of income inequality in China is now accounted for by rural-urban 
differences in income levels. The concentration of growth in urban areas is creating a 
rural-urban divide in employment and earning possibilities, exacerbated by the much 
more rapid development that occurred in coastal areas. Interestingly, in marked 
contrast to most developing countries, relative inequality is higher in China’s rural 
areas than in urban areas. However, there has been convergence over time with a 
steeper increase in inequality in cities.  
 
Indonesia 
During the thirty years before the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, which coincided with the 
New Order under Suharto’s dictatorship, Indonesia GDP grew at an average rate of 7% 
per year. The process was not smooth and went through different phases that implied 
immense structural change. Despite problems with the data, scholars agree in that 
there was a systematic drop in poverty rates between 1976 and 1997. At the same 
time, overall consumption inequality in Indonesia did not change markedly with 
development until the late 1980s, when inequality started to rise, driven by increasing 
income disparities in urban areas. Alatas and Bourguignon (2000) decompose the 
inequality increase between components associated with changes in the structure of 
earnings, changes in occupational choice and changes in the socio-demographic 
structure of the population. They find as main explanations the migration from rural to 
urban areas and the increase in non-farm self-employed work. The increase in 
inequality was partly offset by shrinking income gaps in rural areas (Cameron, 2002). 
Alatas and Bourguignon (2000) find that the returns to land size decreased between 
1980 and 1996; opportunities for off-farm earnings for rural households also 
contributed to falling rural inequality. 
Indonesia was severely hit by a financial crisis: in 1997-1998 GDP dropped by 15%. This 
turned into a sharp decrease in inequality and an increase in poverty. Skoufias and 
Suryahadi (2000) find that this pattern seems to have arisen from a decrease in 
regional inequality. Urban areas (which tend to be wealthier than neighboring rural 
areas) were hit harder, and the urban middle class, who lost their formal sector jobs, 
was harshly affected. As the crisis reduced the per capita expenditure of households, 
the percentage reduction was probably less among the poorer population than among 
the less poor population. Since 2001, and along with the process of decentralization of 
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powers to local authorities, a general pattern of rising consumption inequality has 
been observed. Miranti et al. (2013) suggest that the recent increases in inequality 
may be linked to the higher share of workers employed in the informal sector (70 per 
cent), hence not covered by minimum wage legislation or employment protections. 
 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
The transition from central planning to market system in the countries of Eastern 
Europe (EE) and those belonging to the former Soviet Union (FSU) had profound 
socioeconomic impacts, which could be better documented (compared to the situation 
in previous decades) due to the improvements in the production and release of 
information by the new administrations (Milanovic, 1998).47 The fall of the communist 
regimes was followed by a substantial increase in inequality in almost all countries.48 
According to PovcalNet data the mean Gini for the distribution of per capita 
consumption expenditures grew from 26.4 in 1990 to 31.9 in 1996. The increase in the 
first half of the 1990s was particularly strong in those countries belonging to the FSU 
and in Southeast Europe, and somewhat milder in those economies that joined the 
European Union. Such developments have been linked to the process of privatization, 
which implied an increase in earnings dispersion in comparison to the more 
compressed wage structure of the state-owned firms. One key characteristic of the 
planned economies was the imposition of wage “grids” that forced a wage 
compression; the fast transition from wage setting under the wage grids toward a less 
regulated labor market provoked a rise in the returns to education, and hence a surge 
in inequality.4950 The economic liberalization also triggered changes in the sectorial 
structure of the economy; in particular the ensuing de-industrialization during the 
transition is linked to an increase in inequality (Ferreira, 1999, Milanovic, 1999, 
Ivaschenko, 2002; Birdsall and Nellis 2003). Milanovic and Ersado (2010) highlight the 
role played by the inception or increase of tariffs for utilities, while Standing and 
Vaughan-Whitehead (1995) point to the weakening of the minimum wage as key 
factors behind the increase in inequality. 
After the initial surge in the early 1990s, inequality continued growing in the region in 
the second half of the 1990s although at slower rates. The patterns were more 
heterogeneous in the 2000s; inequality increased in some economies, but went down 
                                                     
47 Much information also existed about pre-1990 earnings and household incomes in (former) 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992) 
48 Milanovic and Ersado (2010); Ivaschenko (2002); Ferreira (1999); Milanovic (1998); Cornia (1996); 
Cornia and Reddy (2001); Mitra and Yemtsov (2006). 
49 See Fleisher, Sabirianova and Wang (2005) for a study of 10 transition economies and Gorodnichenko 
and Sabirianova (2005) for the cases of Russia and Ukraine. 
50 In Hungary, for instance, the income share accrued by the top 1% almost doubled between 1992 and 
2009, from 6-7% to 12%. Half of the increase was due to capital income, while the other half to 
increased earnings (Mavridis and Mosberger, forthcoming). 
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in most countries, especially those in the FSU (World Bank, 2005). The mean Gini for 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the late 2000s was lower than in the late 1990s but 
still significantly higher (around 7 Gini points) than before the transition.51  
 
Latin America and the Caribbean  
All Latin American countries regularly carry out national household surveys that 
include income questions, and in some of them also questions on consumption 
expenditures.52 In contrast, the situation in the Caribbean is much less favorable, as 
surveys are sporadic and information is not easy to access. In fact, trends shown in the 
literature and in this section are restricted to Latin America, which represents 94% of 
total LAC population.  
Latin America experienced two distinct distributive patterns in the last three decades 
(IDB, 1999; de Ferranti et al., 2004; Lopez Calva and Lustig, 2010; Gasparini et al., 
2011). During the 1980s, 1990s, and the crises at the turn of the century, income 
inequality soared in most countries for which comparable data are available. The mean 
Gini for the distribution of household per capita income crawled from 50.1 in 1980 to 
51.5 in 1986, 51.9 in 1992, 53.0 in 1998 and 53.4 in 2002 (Gasparini et al., 2013). The 
frequent macroeconomic crises that hit the region in that period were unequalizing 
because the poor were less able to protect themselves from high and runaway 
inflation, and adjustments programs frequently hurt the poor and the middle-class 
disproportionately (Lustig, 1995). The market-oriented reforms that started in Chile in 
the 1970s and became widespread in the region in the 1990s were associated with 
rising inequality, although this pattern had a notable exception in the case of Brazil 
(López Calva and Lustig, 2010). In most countries employment reallocations brought 
about by trade liberalization and the skilled-biased technical change associated to the 
modernization of the economy implied a sizeable reduction in the demand for 
unskilled labor, which led to higher inequality. In some countries adjustments that led 
to a contraction in the demand for labor affected unskilled workers disproportionately. 
All these changes took place in a framework of weak labor institutions and safety nets, 
and hence their consequences made a full impact on the social situation (Gasparini and 
Lustig, 2011). 
Starting in the late 1990s in a few countries and in the early 2000s for the rest, 
inequality began to decline. The mean Gini for the distribution of household per capita 
income dropped from 53.4 in 2002 to 50.9 in 2008 (Gasparini et al., 2013). Updated 
SEDLAC and BADEINSO statistics suggest that the downward trend continued. The 
evidence, in fact, indicates that between 2002 and 2013 income inequality went down 
                                                     
51 The reader is referred to chapter 20 for a survey of cross-country studies on the multiple causes of 
inequality in OECD, including many countries in Eastern Europe. 
52 The increasing availability of surveys in Latin America allowed the creation of databases that make 
efforts to standardize the generation of poverty and inequality statistics, favoring a close monitoring of 
the social and labor situation in the region (SEDLAC by CEDLAS and the World Bank, and BADEINSO by 
UN´s ECLAC). 
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in all Latin American economies. This remarkable decline appears to be driven by a 
large set of factors, including the improved macroeconomic conditions that fostered 
employment, the petering out of the unequalizing effects of the reforms in the 1990s, 
the expansion of coverage in basic education, stronger labor institutions, the recovery 
of some countries from severe unequalizing crises and a more progressive allocation of 
government spending, in particular monetary transfers. The empirical evidence on the 
driving factors of the recent fall in inequality is, however, still scarce and fragmentary 
(López Calva and Lustig, 2010; Gasparini and Lustig, 2011; Cornia, 2011).  
 
Brazil 
For decades Brazil was singled out as the most unequal economy in Latin America, and 
in some rankings even the most unequal in the world. In the late 1980s the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of household per capita income reached values higher 
than 60. But from that point on inequality started to decrease, first slowly in the 1990s, 
and then more dramatically in the 2000s.53 By 2011 the Gini reached an 
unprecedented low value of 52.7, several points below the level of some other Latin 
American economies (e.g. Honduras, Colombia, Bolivia).54 Brazil - the fifth most 
populous nation in the world - is still a high-inequality country, but it stands out as a 
successful case of consistent reduction of income disparities.  
Data from the Brazil´s national household survey (PNAD) reveals a drop in the Gini of 2 
percentage points in the late 1970s, and no systematic changes for most of the 1980s, 
until a deep macroeconomic crisis hit the country, pulling inequality to unprecedented 
levels. The Gini went up from 59.2 in 1986 to 62.8 in 1989 and returned to 59.9 in 
1993. During the 1990s the Gini moved down very slowly, decreasing by just 1 
percentage point between 1993 and 2001. That pace drastically increased in the 
2000s: the Gini went down from 58.8 in 2001 to 52.7 in 2011, averaging a fall of 0.6 
percentage points a year. During ten years per capita income of the poorest 10% of the 
Brazilian population grew at an average annual rate of 7%, almost three times the 
national average. 
In an in-depth study of the determinants of inequality changes in Brazil, Barros et al. 
(2010) highlight the role played by the sharp fall in earnings inequality and the 
substantial increase in public transfers as the two main direct determinants of the 
decline in income disparities since the early 2000s.55 They find that half of the 
reduction of inequality in labor incomes was associated to the educational progress 
that took place over the previous decade, that significantly increased the ratio 
                                                     
53 See Barros et al. (2010), Ferreira et al. (2007), Foguel and Azevedo (2007), Hoffmann (2006) and 
Langoni (2005). 
54 These values are taken from SEDLAC (2013). All sources confirm the strong decreasing pattern in 
inequality in Brazil.  
55 For evidence and discussion on inequality in the 1990s see Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999), and 
Ferreira et al. (2006). 
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between skilled and unskilled workers. The average years of education for the adult 
population grew 22% in the 2000s and the Gini coefficient computed over the 
distribution of that variable fell 23%, values well above the mean for Latin America 
(Cruces et al., 2013). Using different decomposition techniques, Barros et al. (2010) 
and Azevedo et al. (2011) find a sizeable impact of the fall in the returns to education 
on earnings inequality. Several authors have also found a reduction in spatial and 
sectorial labor market segmentation. The substantial increase in the minimum wage -
68% in real terms between 2002 and 2010 (CEPAL, 2011)- is also underlined as one 
important force behind the fall in household income inequality, given that the 
minimum wage sets the floor for both unskilled workers earnings and for social 
security benefits.  
The strong expansion of public transfers accounts to a large share of the fall in income 
inequality in Brazil (Azevedo et al., 2011; Barros et al., 2010; Bérgolo et al., 2011; Lustig 
et al., 2012). The main force was the rapid expansion in the coverage of government 
cash transfers targeted to the poor, mainly a transfer to the elderly and disabled 
(Benefício de Prestação Continuada) and Brazil’s signature conditional cash transfer 
program Bolsa Família.56 
 
Middle East and North Africa 
Data constraints are particularly limiting when analyzing distributive issues in Middle 
East and North Africa. The lack of accessible and comparable household surveys makes 
it difficult even to identify the extent of poverty and inequality in most MENA 
countries. The oil-rich economies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia) enjoy high levels of per capita income, and are usually not 
included into the analysis of the developing world. In any case, distributive data is 
rarely available for these economies. A second group, by far the largest in terms of 
population, consists of middle income countries. Within this group there are no public 
accessible information for Lebanon and Libya, just one data point for Djibouti, Iraq, 
Syrian Arab Republic, West Bank and Gaza, and only a few for Algeria and Yemen. In 
sum, the only MENA countries for which it is possible to track changes in poverty and 
inequality over time are Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, but even in these 
cases data is scattered and often of low-quality. MENA has a long way to go to build a 
reliable, comparable and sustainable system of household surveys and distributive 
statistics.   
Despite this constraint, several studies shed some light about the trends in inequality 
in this region.57 Authors coincide in dividing the last four decades into three periods. 
The first one, spanning until 1985, was characterized by rapid economic growth. Page 
(2007) reports a substantial reduction in income inequality between the mid-1970s 
                                                     
56 See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Veras Soares (2007). 
57 See Acar and Dogruel (2012), Adams and Page (2003), Bibi and Nabli (2010), Iqbal (2006), Page (2007), 
and Salehi-Isfahani (2010). 
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and the early 1990s.58 Data from PovcalNet confirms that fall, although the magnitude 
is more modest. “Middle Eastern economies entered their rapid growth period with 
income distributions that were becoming more egalitarian, reflecting the political 
ideology and policies of post-colonial governments” (Page, 2007). The second period 
covers the late 1980s and most of the 1990s, and is characterized by low economic 
growth, and meager or no social gains: real per capita incomes increased by less than 
1.5% per year, while income distributions were rather stable. The downward pattern in 
inequality appeared to have resumed in the 2000s, although at a slow pace. According 
to our estimates based on PovcalNet the mean Gini fell from 38.7 in 2002 to 36.8 in 
2010. These values place MENA as a region of moderate inequality within the 
developing world, a fact that have puzzled some authors, that would predict higher 
income disparities given the political process and the balance of political power in 
those societies.59  
Alvaredo and Piketty (2014) analyze the issue from a regional perspective, and show 
that, irrespective of the uncertainties on within-country disparities, income inequality 
is extremely large at the level of the Middle East taken as a whole, simply because 
regional inequality in per capita GNP is particularly large. Under plausible assumptions, 
the top 10% income share could be well over 60%, and the top 1% share might exceed 
25% (vs. 20% in the United States, 9% in Western Europe, and 18% in South Africa). 
The authors conclude that the popular discontent that contributed to the Arab spring 
revolt might reflect the fact that perceptions about inequality and the (un)fairness of 
the distribution are determined by regional (and/or global) inequality, and not only on 
national inequality. 
 
South Asia  
South Asia has been a region of low inequality for developing world standards, though 
rising since the early 1990s. In India, further discussed in a separate box, the 
consumption Gini moved from 30.8 in 1993 to 33.9 in 2010. Bangladesh displayed 
relatively low inequality throughout the 1980s (Gini equal to 26.1 in 1984), but the 
situation worsened since the beginning of the 1990s: the Gini climbed to 32.1 by 2010. 
Khan (2008) argues that incomes from non-farm sources and the high concentration of 
land tenure have all been disequalizing forces, while the positive effects of the more-
evenly distributed farm income were offset partly by its declining share in total 
income. 
Scholars do not always agree about the distributive changes in Pakistan; PovcalNet 
helps defining the picture by providing consumption Ginis of 33.2 for 1990, 28.7 for 
1996 and 30.0 for 2008. The high economic growth during the 1980s contributed to a 
                                                     
58 According to Iqbal (2006) reliable pre-1985 household surveys are only available for Tunisia and Egypt. 
59 “In many MENA countries, from the Maghreb to the Arabian peninsula, power is wielded by rather 
narrow groups… Seen from this perspective, the most puzzling thing about inequality in the Middle East 
is how low it is” (Robinson, 2009). 
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sharp decline in poverty, but it was accompanied by a mild increase in inequality. The 
fall in economic growth during the 1990s resulted in a rise in poverty while inequality 
decreased modestly. According with Akmal (2008) in Pakistan there is an institutional 
structure that excludes a large proportion of the population from the process of 
economic growth as well as governance. 
Sri Lanka experienced rising inequalities between 1985 (Gini of 32.5) and 2007 (Gini 
40.3) –among the highest increase in the region during the period of free market 
reforms, integration to the world markets and high growth–, with a reversal of the 
trend towards 2010 (Gini of 38.3) and persistent regional disparities due to conflict. 
Nepal presents similar dynamics. Gosh (2012) notes that rising inequality reflects two 
components: first, growing vertical inequality within the modern industrial sector 
driven by the returns to skill; and second, increasing disparities between the industrial 
fast-growing sector and the traditional agricultural activities.  
 
India 
Chakravarty (1987) argues that even if policymakers in India adopted a development 
strategy based on central planning over the forty years following independence, “there 
was a tolerance towards income inequality, provided it was not excessive and could be 
seen to result in a higher rate of growth than would be possible otherwise.” One of the 
explicit goals of the socialist program was to limit the economic power of the elite in 
the context of a mixed economy. From the mid-1980s, however, India gradually 
adopted market-oriented economic reforms. Initially, these were accompanied by an 
expansionist fiscal policy involving allocations to rural areas, in order to 
counterbalance the negative redistributive effects of the liberalization. The speed of 
reforms accelerated during the early 1990s, the focus shifted away from state 
intervention towards liberalization, privatization and globalization. 
Most analysis on inequality in India over the last three decades are based on the 
observations from the expenditure surveys conducted in 1983, 1987/8, 1993/94, 
2004/05 and 2009/10 for urban and rural areas, which have allowed for an analysis pre 
and post reforms. Inequality increased significantly in the post-liberalization years, 
especially in urban areas; on the contrary, estimates of absolute poverty measures 
have systematically fallen since 1983. Mazundar (2012) summarizes the main drivers of 
these changes: (i) the lead in employment and output growth has been taken not by 
manufacturing but by the tertiary sector, which displays higher inequality in pay; (ii) 
much of the labor reallocated from agriculture is absorbed in the informal sector, 
where earnings are only slightly higher than the poverty line; (iii) although numerous 
social insurance schemes have been established, their actual impact has been limited 
and regressive as they have disproportionately benefited workers in the small formal 
sector; (iv) the modest and selective increase in social sector spending is constantly 
threatened by the budget deficit; (v) the education polices implemented over the years 
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have been biased towards the promotion of tertiary education and have neglected 
basic primary and lower secondary education. 
From a different perspective, Banerjee and Piketty (2010) looked at the tax-based 
shares of top incomes. Their results suggest that the gradual liberalization of the Indian 
economy made it possible for the top 1% to substantially increase their share of total 
income, from 4.7% in 1980 to 8.9% in 1999. While in the 1980s the gains were shared 
by everyone in the top percentile, in the 1990s it was those in the top 0.1% who 
benefited the most.60  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Although recently there have been many improvements, the lack of a consistent body 
of household surveys undermine the assessment of income inequality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Time series data on inequality is severely lacking in most SSA countries, 
hindering the inferences about trends in the region. For example, in PovcalNet some 
SSA countries are missing (Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Mauritius, Somalia, Zimbabwe), 
while for thirteen of them there is only one observation in the database for the whole 
period 1981-2010. In fact, very few countries have reliable surveys in the 1980s, and it 
is not until the mid-1990s when inequality could be really traced with some confidence 
in the region.  
Regional studies typically report a mixed picture, with both increases and decreases in 
inequality (e.g. ECA, 2004), a fact that could reflect the heterogeneity in the region, but 
also could be caused by noise in the country estimations (Christiansen et al., 2002; 
Okojie and Shimeles, 2006). Bigsten and Shimeles (2003) for instance report that for 17 
African countries the trend in inequality shows significant variations over short 
periods, causing concern about measurement problems. 
The available evidence seems to support some few broad facts about consumption 
inequality in the Sub-Saharan African countries. First, inequality is very high on 
average, possibly the highest in the world. This result is in stark contrast with the 
presumption of low inequality in SSA, held for a long time based on the predictions of 
Kuznets-like models and the absence of reliable data.61 Second, on average inequality 
does not seem to have changed much in the 1990s and 2000s. Data from PovcalNet 
and other sources suggest a slow downward pattern; but in any case the evidence is 
mixed and weak. Third, the heterogeneity among countries in terms of inequality 
levels and patterns is large, partly possibly due to various measurement errors. It is 
                                                     
60 The authors stress that these results could be linked to the debate around the Indian growth paradox 
of the 1990s. According to the household expenditure survey conducted by the National Sample Survey 
(NSS), real per capita growth during the 1990s was fairly limited, in sharp contrast with the fast growth 
measured by national accounts. It was suggested that much of such growth could have gone to the rich, 
absent from surveys. Banerjee and Piketty (2010) conclude that top incomes could explain between 20 
and 40% of the puzzle, which still leaves the bulk of the difference unaccounted for. 
61 Several studies have sought to explain the unexpected result of high inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Milanovic, 2003; Okojie and Shimeles, 2006; Moradi and Baten, 2005; and van de Walle, 2008). 
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hard to identify a prototype of an inequality pattern in SSA, as in other regions such as 
LAC or ECA. The scarce literature on inequality in SSA is consistent with these 
observations. Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou (2007) report that high income inequality 
levels in SSA have remained more or less constant over the last four decades. Okojie 
and Shimeles (2006) underline the fact that SSA is one of the most unequal regions in 
the world, and that disparities have remained persistent over time. In contrast, Sala-i-
Martin and Pinkovskiy (2010) picture a more optimistic scenario, reporting a significant 
downward pattern for inequality during the period of growth (1995 to 2006).  
 
 
South Africa  
Over the last thirty years there have been important studies of inequality and poverty 
in South Africa, and a heated debate about trends in post-apartheid transition.62  
South Africa has long been regarded as having one of the most unequal societies in the 
world. Consistent with this view, the country has the highest Gini coefficient of 
household consumption per capita (63.1 in 2010). During the early 1970s, the 
previously constant racial shares of income started to change in favour of the blacks, at 
the expense of the whites, in a context of declining per capita incomes (McGrath, 
1983; McGrath and Whiteford, 1994). But while inter-racial inequality fell throughout 
the eighties and nineties, inequality within race groups increased (Simkins 1991; 
Whiteford and Van Seventer 2000). Leibbrandt et al. (2010) provide evidence from 
comparable households’ surveys conducted in 1993, 2000 and 2008. These authors 
find that since the fall of apartheid inequality continued to increase steadily, both for 
the whole population and within each racial group. The high level of overall income 
inequality accentuated between 1993 and 2008, incomes becoming increasingly 
concentrated in the top decile. Van der Berg and Louw (2004) also conclude that rising 
black per capita incomes over the past three decades have narrowed the interracial 
income gap, although increasing inequality within the black and Asian/Indian 
population seems to have prevented any decline in aggregate inequality.  
In explaining these changes scholars agree in that the labor market played a dominant 
role, where a rise in the number of blacks employed in skilled jobs (including civil 
service and other high-pay government positions) coupled with increasing mean wages 
for this group of workers. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) indicate that in the initial post-
apartheid period participation rates increased faster than absorption rates with a 
consequent increase in unemployment across all deciles. Since 2000 the aggregate 
unemployment rate declined, but the in the lower deciles the early post-apartheid 
trend continued to 2008. State transfers have increased their importance as an income 
                                                     
62 See, for example, McGrath (1983); McGrath and Whiteford (1994); Klasen (1997 and 2005); Nattrass 
and Seekings (1997); Terreblanche (2002); Dollery (2003); van der Berg and Louw (2004); Leibbrandt et 
al., (2009); Leibbrandt et al., (2010); and Aron et al., (2009). 
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source but not in a way that has substantially narrowed the income gaps. They have, 
however, compensated for the decreasing share of remittance income.  
Increasing inequality and stable poverty are consistent with the rising trend in top 
income shares recorded between 2002 and 2010 by Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010), 
which could be associated to the favorable conditions in the world market for 
agricultural commodities, the increase in the value of minerals other than gold, and 
the developments in the financial sector. 
 
 
4.3. Inequality convergence  
As suggested above, there are signs of inequality convergence among countries in the 
developing world. As an example, the mean Gini coefficient for the 20 most unequal 
countries in our PovcalNet sample in 1981 fell 11% in the following three decades, 
while it increased 58% for the 20 most egalitarian economies. Bénabou (1996) was the 
first to present empirical evidence for cross-country convergence in income inequality 
with data from 1970 to 1990 drawn from the Deininger and Squire dataset. He found 
evidence consistent with the predictions of a neoclassical growth model that yields 
convergence of the entire income distribution and not just the first moment.63 
Evidence on inequality convergence was also found in studies that used improved 
data: Ravallion (2003) based on PovcalNet, Bleaney and Nishiyama (2003) based on 
WIID, and Dhongde and Miao (2013) using both datasets. With variations, a typical 
inequality convergence study estimates  
               α βit i i itG G G t e1 1- = ( + )( - 1) +                     for  t = 2, …, T ; i = 1, …, N, 
where Git is the Gini coefficient for country i in year t and eit is an heteroscedastic error 
term. The parameter β measures the link between the change and the initial Gini, and 
therefore β<0 indicates inequality convergence. Models could be estimated with the 
Gini coefficient in levels or logs. In his early study Bénabou (1996) found a β coefficient 
of -0.039 for a small sample of around 30 countries. Naturally, estimates of β vary 
according to the data used, the period covered, the time horizons considered, and the 
regression model applied. Ravallion (2003) estimated a value of -0.028 in the 1990s, 
Bleany and Nishiyama (2003) a value of -0.0125 between 1965 and 1990, and Dhongde 
and Miao (2013) a value of -0.022 from 1980 to 2005. This literature has also found 
that the impact of the initial Gini coefficient on the inequality change diminishes over 
longer time horizons, and that the speed of inequality convergence is higher than the 
speed of convergence in per capita income.     
                                                     
63 The Bénabou model may not be considered strictly neoclassical, since it involves market imperfections 
and endogenous redistributions (see chapter 15 in this Handbook for an extensive discussion of these 
issues).  
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We add to this literature our own estimates, taking advantage of the PovcalNet panel 
of 76 countries from 1981 to 2010 used in this section. Table 8 shows the OLS and IVE 
estimates of α and β  for different initial years.64 The parameter β is negative and 
significant in all the specifications, suggesting evidence for inequality convergence. The 
estimated coefficients are in the range of those estimated in the literature. 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Inequality convergence 
Models of the change in the Gini coefficient  
 
Note: robust t statistics in parentheses; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; the heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimator is used (HC1). IVE estimates use the initial value as the 
instrument for the inequality measure in the second survey. The number of observations is 456 in the 
first panel, and 281 in the second.  
 
While the evidence for inequality convergence in the last decades seems well-
established, the reasons driven that pattern are not clear. As mentioned before, 
Bénabou (1996) finds the evidence on convergence consistent within the framework of 
a growth model. In contrast, the evidence for unconditional inequality convergence is 
interpreted by Ravallion (2003) as the result of policy and institutional convergence 
since around 1990, when socialist planned economies became more market-oriented, 
and non-socialist economies adopted market reforms.  
 
4.4. Absolute inequality  
While relative inequality has been the preferred concept in empirical work in 
development economics, absolute views of inequality certainly have some intuitive 
appeal (Amiel and Cowell, 1999; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2004). Interestingly, the 
                                                     
64 Caselli et al. (1996) and Dhongde and Miao (2013) discuss biases that may arise in an OLS model. 
However, in the IVE model the instrument used to correct for measurement error may include as much 
measurement error itself.  
Gini Index
OLS 1.098 -0.026 0.49 0.908 -0.023 0.35
(18.90)** (20.38)** (11.20)** (10.97)**
IVE 1.271 -0.031 0.47 0.855 -0.021 0.35
(17.91)** (17.61)** (9.83)** (9.90)**
Difference 0.173 -0.005 -0.053 0.002
Hausman Test (4.26)** (4.03)** (1.69)* (2.61)**
Log Gini Index
OLS 0.118 -0.032 0.65 0.105 -0.029 0.27
(28.41)** (28.11)** (15.53)** (15.14)**
IVE 0.135 -0.037 0.63 0.104 -0.028 0.27
(25.79)** (24.75)** (14.07)** (13.66)**
Difference 0.017 -0.005 -0.001 0.001
Hausman Test (5.30)** (5.01)** (0.49) (0.48)
R 2
Initial year 1981 Initial year 1990
R 2Intercept (α ) Slope (β ) Intercept (α ) Slope (β )
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trends in the two concepts over the last decades have been different in the developing 
world.65 The fact that most countries experienced economic growth, while at the same 
time relative inequality did not fall, implied widening absolute income differences. On 
average, the absolute difference in monthly consumption per capita between the top 
and bottom 10% of each country increased over the two decades from US$415 (PPP 
adjusted) in 1990, to US$497 in 2002, and US$646 in 2010. In more than 90% of the 
countries in the sample that absolute difference was higher in 2010 than in 1990.  
The contrast between the recent trends in absolute and relative inequality in the 
developing countries is illustrated in Figure 11 While relative inequality rose in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, absolute inequality declined, driven by a reduction in mean 
income. The strong growth in the developing world since mid-1990s is reflected in the 
substantial hike in the degree of absolute inequality. Although some equalizing forces 
operated in the 2000s that reduced the relative gaps, they were not enough to narrow 
the absolute gaps in a context of economic growth. Based on these facts, Ravallion 
(2004) argues that the disagreements over whether inequality in the world has gone 
up or down may partly be due to differing views about the importance of absolute 
versus relative conceptions of inequality.  
 
Figure 11 
Absolute and relative Gini coefficients 
Unweighted means, developing countries, 1981-2010 
 
Source: own estimates based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: normalized to 100=mean over the period 1981-2010.The Gini coefficients are computed over the 
distribution of household consumption per capita.  
 
4.5. Aggregate welfare 
The typical way of assessing the economic performance of a country is by means of its 
per capita income or output. However, this practice is valid only when the evaluator’s 
welfare function is utilitarian. Except in this extreme case, measuring aggregate 
welfare involves not only knowing the mean but also other elements of the income 
                                                     
65 See, as an example, the analysis of Atkinson and Lugo (2010) for Tanzania.   
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distribution, in particular the degree of inequality. Although social welfare functions 
are naturally arbitrary, since they depend on the analyst’s value judgments, it is 
common in the literature to work with anonymous, Paretian, symmetric and 
quasiconcave functions. For simplicity, here we consider the abbreviated welfare 
function proposed by Sen (1976), WS=µ.(1-G), where µ is the mean of the distribution 
and G is the Gini coefficient. Figure 12 shows the unweighted mean of WS for the 
developing countries in the period 1990-2010 computed from household survey data. 
In general, aggregate welfare has followed changes in per capita consumption. The fall 
in mean consumption in the early 1990s (mostly due to the negative performance in 
ECA) was reinforced by the increase in inequality, driving welfare down by around 
15%. Between 1993 and 2002 mean consumption went up but the change was 
counterbalanced by a similar increase in the Gini, keeping welfare roughly constant. 
The 2000s witnessed a robust increase in mean consumption, along with some fall in 
inequality, implying a 40% increase in aggregate welfare between 2002 and 2010. 
According to these calculations the mean aggregate welfare in the developing 
countries was 22% higher in 2010 than in 1990, implying an annual growth rate of 
around 1%.  
 
Figure 12 
Aggregate welfare  
Sen welfare function, unweighted mean, developing countries, 1990-2010  
 
Source: own estimates based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: normalized to 100=value in 1990. 
 
In order to calculate welfare it is necessary to have estimates of the mean income and 
some inequality measure. Ideally, both parameters should be estimated from the same 
source, typically a household survey, as we have done so far. Some authors have taken 
a different approach, anchoring the mean to a variable from National Accounts, such 
as per capita GDP or aggregate household consumption expenditures. For several 
reasons changes in mean income from household surveys tend to differ significantly 
from changes in per capita GDP (Deaton, 2003, 2005; Anand and Segal, 2008). Some of 
these differences are natural, since per capita income and GDP are different concepts, 
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but some are rooted in measurement errors both in household surveys and in National 
Accounts. Some authors pay the price of the potential inconsistency of using two 
different data sources (i) in order to avoid departing from the typical growth and 
development literature that is based on National Accounts data, (ii) as a way to 
alleviate the underreporting issue in household surveys, and (iii) to avoid problems 
related to the unavailability of surveys for many years in several countries (Ahluwalia 
et al., 1979; Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Bhalla, 2002).   
In Figure 13 we report the results of computing the unweighted average of aggregate 
welfare across developing countries using alternative mean income variables. 
According to these estimates mean welfare in the developing world grew at an annual 
1% from 1990 to 2010 using mean consumption per capita from household surveys, 
1.6% using per capita GNI from WDI, and 2.1% using per capita GDP from Penn World 
Tables (PWT) (Heston et al., 2012).66 These discrepancies are worrying and call for 
increasing efforts to understand and reduce the gaps among data sources.  
 
Figure 13 
Aggregate welfare for alternative mean variables 
Sen welfare function, unweighted mean, developing countries, 1990-2010  
 
Source: own estimates based on PovcalNet (2013), WDI and PWT. 
Note: mean anchored to per capita consumption (PovcalNet), GNI per capita (WDI) and GDP per capita 
(PWT). Normalized to 100=value in 1990.  
 
The population-weighted mean of the welfare measure grew at a much higher rate, 
due to the positive performance of several large countries.67 The growth rate between 
                                                     
66 In fact, this difference comes from the combination of higher growth recorded in the National 
Accounts in the 1990s compared to household surveys, and the opposite result in the 2000s. For 
instance, while mean per capita GDP slightly fell between 2008 and 2010, mean consumption in 
household surveys increased at annual 2%. 
67 Some authors have computed global welfare, ignoring the division of the world in countries. The 
evidence suggest an increase in aggregate welfare in the developing world in the last decades 
(Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 2009; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010; Pinkovskiy, 2013). 
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1990 and 2010 was 2.3% using household survey data, 3% anchoring mean income to 
per capita GNI from WDI, and 3.3% when using the Penn World Tables.  
 
4.6. Trends from tax records  
At the moment of writing (2014), the WTID offers estimates of the tax-based shares of 
top incomes for a small number of developing countries: Argentina, Colombia, India, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Uruguay and South Africa.68 On-going research analyzes the cases 
of Brazil, Chile and Ecuador over the last decades. Results for the former colonial 
territories -being prepared by Atkinson (British colonies), and Alvaredo, Cogneau and 
Piketty (French colonies)- will be available soon.69 Consequently, evidence in this 
respect is still fragmentary, not only because this particular research program is rather 
recent in what concerns the developing world, but also because of the unavailability of 
tax data. 
The results for the top 1% income share are presented in Figure 14, together with 
survey-based Gini coefficients for six developing countries. Several elements are worth 
mentioning. First, both sources are not directly comparable for the reasons discussed 
in section 3. The top share estimates are in general before taxes, while survey Ginis are 
net of taxes; in addition the units of analysis usually do not match. Second, there is 
substantial heterogeneity in this group, both in levels and dynamics, compared to the 
evidence discussed in chapter 16 for developed countries. It should be borne in mind 
that the differences in the tax systems across countries imply different income 
concepts, so that top share levels should be read with this caveat in mind. Third, Leigh 
(2007), who analyzes 13 developed countries and finds a strong and significant 
relationship between top income shares and broader inequality measures, concludes 
that “panel data on top income shares may be a useful substitute for other measures 
of inequality over periods when alternative income distribution measures are of low 
quality, or unavailable”. Figure 14 seems to agree with the results in Leigh (2007) in 
some cases but not in others. For example, the trends in the Gini coefficient and the 
top 1% share in Colombia are particularly diverging, while the dynamics in Mauritius 
are remarkably similar. Top shares and broader, synthetic inequality measures can 
very well display different trends. The problem arises when the top group plays a 
major role in the changes in inequality and survey data fail to capture high incomes. 
                                                     
68 The results for China (1986-2003) and Indonesia (1982-2004) available in the WTID are based on 
household surveys and not on tax records. The fact that top income share estimates are lower than in 
the most egalitarian developed countries shows that they are likely to be underestimated. In the case of 
China, the rising trend is robust and can be taken as an indicator of the true dynamics of concentration 
at the top. Piketty and Qian (2009) show that top income shares increased at a very high rate during the 
period, which is consistent with the evidence discussed in section 4. The top decile share rose from 
about 17 per cent in 1986 to almost 28 per cent in 2003—that is, by more than 60 per cent. The top 1 
per cent income share more than doubled between 1986 and 2001, from slightly more than 2.6 per cent 
in 1986 to 5.9 per cent in 2003. 
69 This project has assembled data for some forty colonies covering the periods before and after 
independence. Unfortunately, the series stop before 1970 in most cases due to unavailability of recent 
data. 
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Figure 14 
Top 1% income share and Gini coefficients 
Argentina, Colombia, Malaysia, Mauritius, India and South Africa 
 
 
Source: own estimates based on WTID. 
Note: Gini coefficient for Malaysia 2004 identified as outlier. 
 
4.7. Exploring inequality changes 
Explaining changes in the income distribution is a very difficult and challenging task 
that lies well beyond the objectives of this chapter. In this section we briefly review 
some methodologies to study the determinants of the income distribution changes 
and lay out some of the main results regarding developing countries.70 Certainly, there 
has been sustained progress in our understanding of the factors that shape the income 
distributions, but yet the image that emerges from reviewing the literature is still that 
of a patchwork of numerous hypotheses without conclusive empirical support. In 
addition, countries may be very heterogeneous in terms of the importance of the 
various causal factors and their actual effects.   
                                                     
70 Bourguignon et al. (2008) and Ferreira (2010) are excellent references for methodological issues in 
recent research on inequality determinants.   
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Decompositions are one of the most widely used techniques to characterize income 
distribution changes. Typically, an income model is estimated, and a counterfactual 
distribution is simulated modifying some elements of the estimated income model 
(e.g. parameters or the distribution of observable factors), while keeping the rest fixed. 
The difference between the actual and the simulated distribution captures the first-
round partial-equilibrium effect of the change under study.71 The method generates 
entire counterfactual distributions, and hence can capture the heterogeneity of 
impacts throughout the distribution. The decompositions have been typically used to 
shed light on the impact of changes in the returns to education, in the demographic, 
sectorial, occupational and educational composition of the population, and in labor 
and social policies. The decompositions do not allow for the identification of causal 
effects, and suffer from the usual problems of equilibrium-inconsistency and path 
dependence. Nevertheless, these types of exercises are informative about the relative 
strength of several direct determinants that may be driving the distributive changes, 
and therefore could be useful in identifying areas in which to focus the research 
efforts.   
Ideally, income distribution changes should be studied in a general equilibrium 
framework, since they are the result of complex processes that involve all sorts of 
effects and interactions throughout the economy. Computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models have been applied to study changes in the income distributions around 
the developing world. These exercises, however, depend critically on parameters and 
functions that are difficult to estimate, and rely on many simplifying assumptions. The 
more recent macro-micro approach combines a CGE model (the macro component) 
with a microsimulation (the micro component). CGE models provide a framework to 
assess consistency of policy alternatives, but lack the necessary disaggregation for the 
analysis of distributive issues, which is provided by the microsimulations. The macro 
and micro components of this methodology communicate through aggregate variables 
such as employment levels and wage rates that are generated by the CGE model and 
used as inputs in the microsimulations (Bourguignon et al., 2008; Bourguignon and 
Bussolo, 2012). In a related approach, rather than building a full general equilibrium 
model of the economy, researchers rely on a reduced-form relationship between a set 
of observed exogenous variables (such as changes in tariff rates) and a set of sector-
level variables (such as industry-skill wage premia), that serve as inputs in the 
microsimulations.72 
A very different strand of the literature involves the estimation of cross-country 
regressions, typically with panel data, where an aggregate measure of overall 
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, is linked to various potential causal factors (e.g. 
                                                     
71 See Bourguignon et al. (2005); Barros et al. (2006) and Bourguignon et al. (2008), for methodological 
proposals; Bourguignon et al. (2005) for applications to Asia and Latin America, and Inchauste et al. 
(2012) for a recent application to poverty reduction in Bangladesh, Peru and Thailand. Fortin et al. 
(2011) and Essama Nssah (2012) are useful surveys of the economic literature on decompositions. 
72 Ferreira et al. (2010) use this approach to estimate the effect of a trade liberalization episode on the 
distributions of wages and household incomes in Brazil. 
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Li et al., 1998; Anderson, 2005). Naturally, endogeneity problems are endemic to this 
approach, which is useful to characterize the structure of correlations among variables, 
but less successful in identifying causal links.  
Most of the literature takes a less ambitious but probably more productive road, and 
focus on the partial-equilibrium impact of specific shocks and policy changes, using 
different identification strategies depending on the characteristics of the shock/policy 
and the data available. Examples of these methodologies include (i) a typical supply 
and demand approach, where the impact of indicators of trade, technology or other 
factors on the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers is estimated, 
controlling for relative supply; (ii) the cost function approach, where the impact of 
several indicators on the share of skilled wages in the total wage bill is estimated, using 
flexible cost functions (usually a translog cost production function); and (iii) mandated 
wage regressions.73 When experiments with random assignment are available, causal 
links are more clearly identified. For instance, the conditional cash transfer program 
Progresa in Mexico was initially implemented with a random assignment of treated 
and control rural villages, which allowed a rigorous impact evaluation. Taking 
advantage of that design, Todd and Wolpin (2006) estimate a full structural model of 
behavior, including education, fertility and labor supply decisions, a model that can be 
used to simulate the distributive impact of policies and shocks.74  
The bulk of the distributive analysis in developing countries has focused mainly on the 
labor market and on public and private transfers, while largely setting aside the role 
played by other sources of income, such as capital, land rents and business profits. The 
neglect of these other factors is essentially due to the fact that household surveys fail 
to capture these income sources properly.75 This shortcoming has, for instance, 
severely limited the study of the impact of the natural resources exploitation on 
inequality, a relevant topic in several developing countries.76 Most studies narrow the 
analysis to particular indicators of the labor market, such as the wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled labor (the wage premium) or the returns to education. For 
instance, Bourguignon et al. (2005) show that increases in returns to schooling were 
large contributors to increasing inequality in East Asia and Latin America in the 1990s.  
In what follows we review some general debates on the determinants of recent 
inequality changes.  
Growth and development. As shown in Section 3.5 there is a significant negative 
relationship between inequality and measures of development, such as GNI per capita, 
in a cross-section of countries. From this evidence Ferreira and Ravallion (2009) 
                                                     
73 See Anderson (2005). 
74  See also Parker and Skoufias (2001) and Gertler (2004) for impact evaluations studies of the Mexican 
conditional cash transfer program.  
75 For instance, according to SEDLAC data, on average in Latin America in 2010 the share of labor income 
in total household income was 82.3%, the share of transfers (including pensions) 13.9%, and the rest of 
the sources just 3.8%. 
76 See Caselli and Michaels (2013).  
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conclude that “high inequality is a feature of underdevelopment”. However, the short 
or medium run relationship between inequality and development has proved to be 
elusive. There appears to be no evidence in the last decades of a significant correlation 
between the growth rate of an economy and the change in the inequality level 
(Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Ravallion, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Ferreira and 
Ravallion, 2009).77 Ravallion (2007), for example, analyzed 290 episodes in 80 
countries in 1980-2000 and found a correlation coefficient non-significant at the 10% 
level between the changes in the log of the Gini coefficient and changes in the log of 
mean income in real terms between successive household surveys. The analysis of 
more recent data from PovcalNet leads to the same conclusion. Using 473 spells in the 
period 1981-2010 we find a non-significant coefficient of -0.0094. A similar result 
applies when restricting the sample to observations after 1990 or 2000, or when 
considering longer spells.78 The data suggests that among both growing and 
contracting economies, inequality increased about as often as it fell. In the last 
decades economic growth has been distribution-neutral on average in the developing 
countries.79 
 
Globalization. Much of the recent public and academic debate on inequality changes 
has been related to the rise in globalization. In the latest decades most developing 
countries have experienced increasing openness to international trade, capital markets 
flows and foreign direct investment. The theoretical channels linking these changes to 
inequality are multiple and complex, which accounts for the lack of conclusive 
empirical results (Wood, 1997; Rama, 2003; Winters et al., 2004; Anderson, 2005; 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Harrison et al., 2011). While studies in cross sections of 
developing countries are inconclusive in relation to the impact of globalization upon 
inequality, several longitudinal estimates concerning countries taken separately or in 
small groups reveal a positive correlation between openness and the relative demand 
for skilled labor (Anderson, 2005; Goldberg and Pavnick, 2007; Harrison et al., 2011; 
Chusseau and Hellier, 2012). Trade openness may affect the income distribution 
through various channels. The traditional Stolper-Samuelson effect predicts a 
reduction in the skill premium in unskilled-labor-abundant developing countries, a 
prediction that does not appear to be confirmed by the facts (Goldberg and Pavnick, 
2007; Feenstra, 2008). While some of the research has pointed then to non-trade 
factors - such as skill-biased technological change and labor institutions - to explain 
rising wage gaps, in recent years new mechanisms have been explored through which 
trade can increase income inequality. These mechanisms include heterogeneous firms 
                                                     
77 A related literature finds no support for a Kuznets curve with longitudinal data (Bruno, 1998; Fields, 
2002; Hellier and Lambrecht, 2012). 
78 The relationship becomes negative, although just slightly significant, when using the change in log real 
per capita GDP (Penn World Tables) or per capita GNI (WDI) as measures of growth.  
79 Ravallion (2004) argues that, on average, growth is not associated with increases in relative inequality 
but absolute inequality, and it is these higher absolute gaps between "rich" and "poor" that generate 
the perception of an unequal growth processes. 
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and bargaining, trade in tasks, labor frictions and incomplete contracts (Harrison et al., 
2011). In addition, competition among developing countries may increase inequality in 
middle-income countries (e.g. Latin America) competing with low-income 
economies.80 Also, the growing size of the developing world, as new countries enter 
the world markets, may foster inequality by augmenting the world endowment of 
unskilled labor. The literature finds that the mechanisms through which globalization 
affects income distribution are country, time, and case specific, and therefore the 
impacts of trade liberalization need to be examined in conjunction with other 
concurrent policy reforms (Goldberg and Pavnick, 2007). In addition, and due to 
various limitations, the literature is mostly focused on the static link between 
globalization and income distribution that typically operates through changes in 
relative prices and wages, rather than on the dynamic, more indirect link from trade to 
growth, and then to poverty and inequality.  
 
Technology and education. Skill-biased technological change has been a popular 
explanation for the rise in inequality in the developed countries. Changes in 
technology, such as the use of computers, increase the relative demand for skilled 
workers driving the skill premium up. This hypothesis is also plausible in the developing 
world, where globalization increased the transfers of more skill-intensive technologies 
from the North, and fostered imports of capital goods, typically complementary of 
skilled labor. Several studies find that openness-driven technological transfers tend to 
increase inequality in emerging countries (Conte and Vivarelli, 2007). The increase in 
the wage skill premium may be temporary, as the introduction of new technologies 
requires a transitional period during which skilled workers are employed to adapt the 
firm to the new technology (Pissarides, 1997; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998). The 
empirical applications usually show evidence on the short and medium-run effects of 
the reforms, failing to capture the long-run impact. The generalized fall in inequality in 
the 2000s in the developing world might be in part attributed to the petering out of 
the unequalizing initial impact of the liberalizing reforms and technological shocks 
experienced by many countries in the 1990s. 
The increase in education may counteract the effect of skill-biased technological 
change in the Tinbergen´s race between education and technology.81 In fact, education 
has expanded in the developing world at high rates during the last decades, mitigating 
the impact of other factors that tend to increase the wage premium.82 However, the 
link between education and income inequality may not be that straightforward. Given 
                                                     
80 The increase in inequality in Latin America has also been explained arguing that it is a region relatively 
abundant in natural resources, while in the onset of liberalization Asian countries were relatively 
abundant in unskilled labor (Wood, 1997).  
81 According to Tinbergen (1975) changes in earnings inequality are the outcome of a “race” between 
technological progress raising the demand for skills, and the expansion of education raising the supply of 
skills. 
82 See Gasparini et al. (2011) for Latin America. 
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the convexities in the returns to education, even an equalizing increase in schooling 
may generate an unequalizing change in the distribution of earnings. Bourguignon, 
Ferreira and Lustig (2005) have labeled this phenomenon “the paradox of progress”, a 
situation where an educational expansion is associated to higher inequality.83  
 
Market reforms. Several developing countries have implemented market-oriented 
reforms in the last decades, reducing regulations and privatizing firms. The 
paradigmatic case includes the former socialist planned economies in ECA, but the 
transition from centrally planned to market-oriented economies was also experienced 
by several African and Asian countries, including China. The evidence suggests a 
significant increase in inequality over the transition period. That surge has been linked 
to the process of privatizations, that implied an increase in the earnings dispersion in 
comparison to the more compressed wage structure of the state-own firms, and the 
institutional and regulatory reforms that have increased competition in product and 
factor markets and decreased the bargaining power of labor.84 Other non-socialist 
economies also adopted market-friendly reforms; Ravallion (2003) argues that in some 
cases (e.g. Brazil) pre-reform controls benefited the rich and kept inequality high, and 
then reforms help lowering inequality, while in some others (e.g. India) the controls 
(and the reforms) had the opposite effect.  
 
Fiscal and social policy. Developing countries are characterized by relatively low levels 
of taxation, heavy reliance on regressive revenue instruments, and low coverage and 
benefit levels of transfer programs (World Bank, 2006). This structure limits the 
redistributive potential of fiscal policy and in some cases even exacerbates the market 
income disparities.85 While average tax ratios for advanced economies exceed 30 per 
cent of GDP, ratios in developing economies (excluding emerging Europe) generally fall 
in the range of 15–20 per cent of GDP (Baltagi et al., 2012). Tax collection is not only 
lower but also more regressive than in developed countries. The difficulties in 
collecting more progressive taxes are related to the high levels of self-employment and 
sizeable informal sectors, which limit the capacity of the tax authorities to verified 
taxpayers´ income and assets. On the spending side, in most developing economies 
social spending is relatively low, and participation in social insurance schemes is 
restricted to high-income workers in the formal sector and to public sector 
                                                     
83 Inequality may also increase after an education expansion, given that wage dispersion is larger at 
higher educational levels (Alejo, 2012). 
84 See Cornia (1996), Milanovic (1998), Ferreira (1999), Cornia and Reddy (2001), and Milanovic and 
Ersado (2010). 
85 For instance, Lustig (2012) finds that in some Latin American countries when indirect taxes are taken 
into account, the net income of the poor and the near poor can be lower than before taxes and cash 
transfers. 
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employees.86 All these factors combine for a low redistributive impact of the fiscal 
policy. For instance, Goñi et al. (2008) and Lustig (2012) find that the tax and transfer 
system in Latin America decreased the market Gini by only 2 percentage points, a 
meager impact compared to the 20-points impact estimated in 15 European 
economies.  
Since the mid-1990s there have been some encouraging signs of improvement, 
especially in terms of increasing coverage and better targeting of social policies. The 
recent expansion of conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) implies a promising 
approach for enhancing the distributive impact of public spending in developing 
economies. CCTs typically transfer income to poor households, conditional on 
households making certain investments on their children's human capital – education, 
health and nutrition. Such programs have been adopted in many developing 
economies, including some Sub-Saharan African countries, although on a smaller scale 
(Fiszbein and Shady, 2009; Garcia and Moore, 2012). CCTs became particularly popular 
in LAC: by 2010 there were 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean applying 
CCTs, covering 20% of total LAC population, and spending on average 0.40% of GDP 
(Cruces and Gasparini, 2012). Soares et al. (2009) estimate that the CCTs in Brazil and 
Mexico reduced the Gini for disposable income by 2.7 percentage points, accounting 
for about a fifth of the decrease in that index between the mid-1990s and the mid-
2000s.  
 
Macroeconomic crises. The scale of the recent crisis has placed the distributive impact 
of macroeconomic shocks back on the agenda. Banking crises, crashes in stock and real 
estate markets and GDP collapses are events with potential large effects on the 
income distribution. Atkinson and Morelli (2011) were the first in addressing this issue 
from an empirical, historical and global perspective. They investigated the effect of 
crises on inequality as well as the impact of inequality on the probability of economic 
crises, by analyzing the history of banking, consumption and GDP collapses over a 100-
year period in 25 countries, out of which only 6 are developing economies. These 
authors observed the variation in distributive variables taking a 5-year window before 
and after the crisis date, and classified each one according to whether inequality was 
increasing, constant or decreasing before and afterwards.87 Table 9, panel A, 
reproduces their results specifically regarding GDP collapses.88 They identified 103 
crises, but for only one third there is information on inequality changes. The shadowed 
diagonal shows combinations where the trajectory was unchanged; above the diagonal 
                                                     
86 ILO (2010) reports that in the early 2000s the share of the population above the legal retirement age 
receiving a pension in developing economies was, on average, around 40 per cent, as compared to 90 
per cent in European economies. 
87 In the case of the Gini coefficient, a change is considered significant when it is higher than 0.7 
percentage points (that is, 1/3 of 2 Gini points).  
88 A collapse is identified as a cumulative percentage drop in per capita GDP (from peak to trough) of at 
least 9.5% for 1911 to 1950 and of 5% for the post-1950 period. Their results are somewhat different 
when they look at banking crisis and consumption collapses, but not more conclusive. 
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are cases where the trajectory “bent” downward; below the diagonal are cases where 
the trajectory “bent” upward. As it is readily apparent, one cannot draw firm 
conclusions: (i) the raw totals show that most crisis did not involve changes in 
inequality ex-post; (ii) the number of cases above the diagonal is low and not very 
different from the cases below the diagonal, which means that GDP crisis are not 
necessarily associated with a specific direction in the change of inequality; and (iii) the 
inverted V shape (inequality increasing and then decreasing) is not prevalent. Atkinson 
and Morelli (2011) conclude that “economic crises differ a great deal in whether or not 
they were preceded by rising inequality, and, in any case, where there was such a rise, 
causality is not easy to establish.” When banking crisis are analyzed instead of GDP 
drops, the cases in which inequality tend to increase following a crisis are in majority. 
We replicate their methodology for the years 1980-2010 to take into account the set 
of developing countries, and show the results in panel B of Table 9.89 Even if our list is 
not exhaustive and could be considerably improved, we identified at least 67 crises 
episodes. As in general they occurred during the 1980s or early 1990s, it is not 
surprising that in most cases inequality changes before the crises remain unknown due 
to data unavailability. There is a tendency for inequality to rise after a GDP collapse (10 
cases), but again the numbers are too small to draw conclusions, and this could just be 
the continuation of a previous tendency. This is not necessarily in contradiction with 
Atkinson and Morelli (2011) due to at least two reasons: (i) GDP crises may well be 
more correlated with financial crises in the developing world, and (ii) such conclusion is 
highly influenced by the experience of the transition economies after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. It should also be noted that several of the canonical Latin American 
exchange rate crises of the 1980s and 1990s, with the exception of Argentina and 
Brazil (included in Atkinson and Morelli, 2011), do not fall within our classification of a 
collapse. In this sense, there is much work to be done about the magnitude of a crisis 
and its sensitivity on the two-way relationship with inequality. In any case, the pattern 
in Latin America points to an increase in inequality before the crashes (regressive 
inflation tax, rise in unemployment due to openness to trade and loss of 
competitiveness from exchange rate mismanagement), then followed by short-term 
reductions after stabilization programs.90  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
89 Given the higher volatility of per capita GDP in developing countries, we have kept the threshold of 
9.5% drop to identify crisis for 1980-2010. The data come from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
Changes in Gini coefficient are taken from PovcalNet.  
90 The case studies are numerous; see for example Forbes (2011) and Lustig (1990). 
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Table 9 
Inequality and GDP collapses 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013) and WDI. 
 
Others. Of course this brief review does not exhaust the multiple factors behind 
distributive changes in the developing world; in fact, arguably any shock or policy could 
affect the income distribution. For instance, demographic factors, such as the decline 
in fertility, the rise in life expectancy and the growing importance of assortative mating 
and single-parent households have been identified as relevant sources of inequality 
changes. Labor policies are a key target for research, as well. Several studies find that 
the weakening of labor institutions such as unions and the declining real value of 
minimum wages were responsible for the increase in earnings inequality in several 
developing countries, especially in the 1990s, while more ambitious labor policies 
contributed to the reduction in inequality in the 2000s. Migration and sector changes 
are also determinants of inequality changes, studied at least since the seminal 
contributions by Lewis (1954) and Kuznets (1955). Changes in inequality are associated 
to the geographic and sectorial pattern of growth (Loayza and Raddatz, 2010). Ferreira 
and Ravallion (2009), for instance, report that in Indonesia a large share of the increase 
in inequality was associated with migration from wage employment in agriculture to 
urban self-employment.91     
 
5. Poverty: levels  
The vast literature on poverty measurement suggests that there are neither normative 
nor objective arguments to set an unambiguous threshold below which everybody is 
poor and above which everyone is non-poor (Deaton, 1997). Despite this central 
conceptual ambiguity, reducing poverty is a deliberate policy objective for 
governments around the world. The international community has embraced this goal 
as reflected in the first Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015. In 
this section we focus on measures of poverty in the income/consumption space using 
international poverty lines in terms of US dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity 
(PPP). This choice implies taking a one-dimensional, monetary, static, absolute view of 
                                                     
91 The role of migration has been particularly relevant regarding global inequality (Milanovic, 2012). 
Panel A (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011) Panel B (developing countries 1980-2010)
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poverty, that certainly has many limitations and drawbacks, but it is still the best 
available paradigm to summarize deprivations in the world.  
The $1-a-day per person at PPP is a poverty standard meant to define an international 
norm to gauge at the inability to pay for food needs.92 The $1 line, proposed in 
Ravallion et al. (1991) and used in World Bank (1990), was chosen as being 
representative of the national poverty lines found among low-income countries. The 
line was recalculated in 1993 PPP terms at $1.0763 a day (Chen and Ravallion, 2001), 
and more recently in 2005 PPP at $1.25 a day (Ravallion et al., 2009).  
In order to make international comparisons of economic aggregates researchers have 
long favored the use of PPP conversion rates, instead of market exchange rates, with 
the aim of assuring parity in terms of purchasing power over both internationally 
traded and nontraded goods. The simplicity of the PPP adjustment however entails 
several potential drawbacks for the international comparison of poverty measures, 
that have been extensively discussed in the literature.93 For instance, a concern is that 
the weights attached to different commodities in the conventional PPP rate may not 
be appropriate for the poor.94 The main data sources for estimating PPPs are the price 
surveys carried out within countries for the International Comparison Program (ICP) 
(World Bank, 2008). Although the estimation of PPP conversion rates has substantially 
improved in the last decades, it still has many limitations, including high variability: the 
switch from 1993 to 2005 PPP figures led to significant changes in absolute poverty 
measures in some countries.95   
The $1.25 line is usually deemed too low for middle-income countries; for that reason 
it is typical to compute poverty with the $2-a-day standard, which is close to the 
median of the official poverty lines chosen by the developing countries. Although these 
international lines have been criticized, their simplicity and the lack of reasonable and 
easy-to-implement alternatives have made them the standard for international 
poverty comparisons.96 While the measurement of poverty with national lines takes 
into consideration that societies differ in the criteria used to identify the poor, the 
international lines are unavoidable instruments to compare absolute poverty levels 
and trends across countries, and provide regional and world poverty counts.  
The World Bank is the main institution that regularly produces information on poverty 
measurement in the developing world drawn from original microdata from household 
                                                     
92 For simplicity, the sign $ is used to refer to US dollars. 
93 See Anand and Segal (2008), Deaton and Dupriez (2008), Deaton and Heston (2010), Ravallion (2010) 
and Chen and Ravallion (2001). 
94 Deaton and Dupriez (2008) estimated PPPs for the poor‖for a subset of countries; the results do not 
suggest that the re-weighting has much impact on the conversion rates. 
95 Likely, the next round of PPP indicators (2011) will be affected by the same type of problems. 
96 For the debate on the international measurement of poverty, see Reddy and Pogge (2010), Deaton 
(2010) and chapter 12 by Anand and Segal in this volume. Gentilini and Sumner (2012) compute global 
poverty using the national poverty lines officially set in each country instead of using international 
poverty standards.  
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surveys.97 In 2013, the World Bank released an update of the developing world's 
poverty estimates for 1981-2010. The new poverty estimates combine the PPP 
exchange rates for household consumption from the 2005 International Comparison 
Program with data from more than 850 household surveys across 127 developing 
countries. In this section we rely heavily on that dataset (PovcalNet). 
The problem of the choice of the welfare variable discussed for inequality in section 3 
applies to the measurement of poverty, as well. While poverty estimates in PovcalNet 
refer to consumption deprivation, in most countries in Latin America and a few others 
in the rest of the world they are constructed from income data. After computing 
consumption and income poverty in 22 household surveys of 7 Latin American 
countries using the $2 standard, we find that on average the ratio 
consumption/income poverty is 0.97 with only small differences across countries. 
Given this piece of evidence we decided not to perform an adjustment for income 
poverty figures in the analysis that follows. 
 
5.1. Income poverty in the developing world  
Although poverty is a ubiquitous characteristic of the developing economies, its 
severity widely varies across countries. Figure 15 shows the poverty headcount ratio in 
most of the developing countries in the world, using the $2-a-day poverty line. The 
figure reveals the enormous differences among developing nations in terms of 
monetary deprivation. While there are economies where the proportion of the 
population living with less than 2 dollars a day is below 2%, in several countries that 
proportion exceeds 80%. The problem of absolute income poverty has a radically 
different scale in some countries compared to others, even within the developing 
world.  
In 2010, 41 per cent of the population in the developing world lived with less than $2 a 
day. The unweighted mean headcount ratio was significantly lower: in a typical 
developing country 33 per cent of the population was poor according to that criterion. 
The difference between the weighted and unweighted mean is not determined by 
China, as the incidence of poverty in that country is similar to the developing world 
mean, but by India (and to a lesser extent Indonesia and Pakistan), where the 
deprivation measures are substantially higher. In fact, when ignoring India both the 
weighted and unweighted headcount ratios become very close (33.3 and 32.7). The 
median poverty rate is also lower than the mean (23.5 for the $2 line). Table 10 reports 
these results for other indices and poverty lines. Interestingly, when using the $1.25 
line the weighted mean is lower than the unweighted mean for the poverty gap and 
the squared poverty gap, a result driven by the relatively low value of these indicators 
in China and Indonesia.   
 
                                                     
97 Ahulwalia et al. (1979) was an early attempt to measure poverty in the developing countries.  
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Figure 15 
Poverty headcount ratio 
Developing countries, 2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted 
$2-a-day line.  
 
 
Table 10 
Poverty measures  
Developing countries, 2010 
  
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita.  
 
The picture of poverty in the developing world is not significantly affected by changing 
the poverty indicator or the poverty line. The correlations across countries when using 
alternatively the headcount (H), the poverty gap (PG) and the squared poverty gap 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
P
ov
er
ty
 h
ea
dc
ou
nt
China
Indonesia
Brazil
India
weighted mean std.dev median
$ 1.25 poverty line
     Headcount   21.4 19.6 22.9 9.3
     Poverty gap 6.5 7.5 10.7 2.9
     Squared poverty gap 3.0 4.0 6.5 1.0
$ 2 poverty line
     Headcount   41.0 33.0 30.1 23.5
     Poverty gap 15.8 14.5 16.4 7.1
     Squared poverty gap 8.1 8.3 10.9 4.0
$ 4 poverty line
     Headcount   66.7 54.8 33.6 59.3
     Poverty gap 35.9 29.6 24.0 25.4
     Squared poverty gap 22.9 19.5 18.5 13.2
unweighted
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(SPG) with a given poverty line are all higher than 0.9.98 For a fixed indicator the 
correlations are higher than 0.95 when changing the poverty line. The correlations are 
only slightly lower when changing both the indicator and the line (e.g. 0.85 for SPG 
with the $1.25 line and H with the $2 line). 
The top ten steps in the poverty ladder, using the headcount ratio with the $2 line, are 
all occupied by Sub-Saharan African countries.99 The following ten features also eight 
SSA economies, in addition to a Caribbean country (Haiti), and a South Asian nation 
(Bangladesh). However, given its size, India is the country with the largest number of 
poor people. While around 840 million people in that country live with less than $2 a 
day, the number in the second nation in that ranking, China, is less than a half (359). 
Both countries are home of 52% of the poor in the world, while the following four 
countries - Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan – represent 19%. Of course, 
these exact figures are valid only for a specific definition of income poverty, but the 
main results are robust to changes in indices and poverty lines.100  
As expected, the relationship between mean consumption and poverty is very tight 
(Figure 16, panel A). A simple model of the headcount ratio ($2 line) on log mean 
consumption per capita estimated in a cross section of developing countries for 2010 
accounts for more than 70% of the variation in the data. The cross-country relationship 
between poverty and inequality is much looser (panel B). The correlation coefficient 
between the headcount ($2 line) and the Gini is 0.17 (barely significant at 5%). The 
relationship is somewhat tighter with other poverty indices, but still in all cases the 
correlation coefficients are lower than 0.3. The magnitude of the correlations is similar 
when considering different income shares as measures of inequality.  
Table 11 shows some simple regressions aimed at characterizing the relationship 
between poverty, mean income and inequality in a cross-section of developing 
countries. The results of course do not have any causal implication, and then are not 
helpful to orient policy, but nonetheless are illustrative of the empirical relationship 
among these three variables. An increase (cross-country) of 1% in mean consumption 
is associated to a fall of around 2% in the headcount ratio, while a drop of 1% in the 
Gini coefficient is associated to a reduction of around 3.3% in poverty measured by the 
headcount. The results are similar when measuring deprivation with the squared 
poverty gap.  
 
  
                                                     
98 The results are also robust to other poverty measures that do not belong to the FGT family, such as 
the Sen and Watts indices. 
99 Rwanda, Mozambique, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Madagascar, Burundi, Congo Dem. Rep. 
and Liberia.  
100 The share of India and China in the world poor is 47% with the $1.25 line, 52% with the $2 line and 
51% with the $4 line.   
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Figure 16 
Poverty, mean consumption and inequality  
Developing countries, 2010 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted 
2$-a-day line.  
 
 
Table 11 
Regressions of poverty measures  
Developing countries, 2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted 
$2-a-day line. ln y=log mean household consumption/income per capita; share d1= share of decile 1 in 
the household consumption/income per capita distribution; share d1-d6=cumulative share of deciles 1 
to 6. Robust standard deviations are shown under the coefficients. *** significant at 1% level.  
 
5.2. Poverty by region  
Poverty has a clear regional component: Table 12 reveals that Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia is always the region with the lowest income poverty, followed by Middle 
East and North Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Poverty in South Asia is 
substantially larger than in Eastern Asia when weighting by population, but roughly 
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Share d1 -0.74 -0.91
(0.073)*** (0.071)***
Share d1-d6 -0.12 -0.13
(0.011)*** (0.012)***
Constant 12.6 0.1 14.8 16.1 11.0 -3.1 13.8 15.1
(0.577)*** (1.30) (0.484)*** (0.561)*** (0.64)*** (1.39) (0.473)*** (0.586)***
R2 0.72 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.68 0.84 0.87 0.85
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similar when ignoring weights. All income poverty measures are substantially higher in 
Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the developing world.  
 
Table 12 
Poverty indicators by region  
Developing countries, 2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita.  
 
Figure 17 unveils the considerable heterogeneity within each geographic region. When 
using the $2 line, the poverty headcount ratio ranges in EAP from 1.4 (Malaysia) to 
70.6 (Timor-Leste), in ECA from 0.1 (Slovenia) to 35.6 (Georgia), in LAC from 1.2 
(Uruguay) to 80.1 (Haiti), in MENA from 1.6 (Jordan) to 45.6 (Yemen), in SA from 6.8 
(Maldives) to 76.5 (Bangladesh), and in SSA from 1.5 (Seychelles) to 94.5 (Liberia). 
Figure A.1 in the Appendix displays a map of the poverty levels in the world that 
illustrates the regional differences, as well as the within-region heterogeneities. 
 
  
East Asia & 
Pacific
Eastern 
Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean
Middle East 
& North 
Africa South Asia 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Weighted
 $1.25 line
      Headcount 12.5 1.0 5.5 2.4 31.0 48.5
      Poverty gap 2.8 0.3 2.9 0.6 7.1 20.9
      Squared poverty gap 0.9 0.2 2.1 0.2 2.4 11.8
 $2 line
      Headcount 29.7 2.4 10.4 12.0 66.7 69.9
      Poverty gap 9.7 0.7 4.7 2.8 23.4 35.7
      Squared poverty gap 4.2 0.3 3.2 1.0 10.5 22.4
Unweighted
 $1.25 line
      Headcount 17.9 1.6 8.6 3.5 17.6 41.5
      Poverty gap 5.1 0.5 4.0 0.9 3.9 16.6
      Squared poverty gap 2.3 0.2 2.6 0.3 1.3 8.8
 $2 line
      Headcount 38.4 5.2 15.6 13.5 43.5 62.2
      Poverty gap 13.8 1.5 7.0 3.5 14.1 30.2
      Squared poverty gap 6.7 0.6 4.4 1.4 6.1 18.1
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Figure 17 
Poverty headcount ratio 
Developing countries, 2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted 
$2-a-day line.  
 
There is a considerable degree of spatial correlation of poverty measures across 
countries. The Moran scatterplot is a way to illustrate that spatial correlation (Figure 
18). The horizontal axis shows the normalized headcount ratio of a country ($2 line), 
while the vertical axis depicts a weighted average of its neighbors´ normalized poverty 
rates, where neighborhood is defined in terms of geographical proximity. The graph 
suggests a strong positive correlation between a country poverty incidence rate and 
that of its neighbors (the Moran correlation coefficient is 0.507, significant at 1%).  
Almost 80% of the countries are either in the HH cells (high poverty for the country 
and its neighbors) or in the LL cells.   
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Figure 18 
Spatial correlation of poverty rates 
Moran´s scatterplot 
Developing countries, 2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted 
$2-a-day line. z is the normalized poverty headcount ratio (the value minus the mean, divided by the 
standard deviation), Wz is the weighted average of the normalized poverty headcount ratios of a 
country´s neighbors, where the weights W are defined in terms of contiguity.   
 
The poverty gap indicator has an intuitive-appealing interpretation: when normalized 
by the poverty line and the total population of a country, it gives the total cost needed 
to end poverty, in the particular case in which cash transfers could be perfectly 
targeted to poor people in the amount just needed to reach the poverty line, and no 
changes in behavior take place. Table 13 shows the unweighted mean across countries 
of the cost of eliminating poverty as percentage of GDP under this scenario in each 
region. Although the context is clearly unrealistic, the figures give a rough idea of the 
magnitude of the task of fighting poverty in each region of the developing world in 
relation to the available economic resources. While eliminating poverty with the $2 
line in this scenario would require on average less than 1 GDP point in the economies 
of ECA and between 1 and 2 points in MENA and LAC, the size of the effort is larger in 
Asia and orders of magnitude greater in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Table 13 
The cost of eliminating poverty 
Total poverty gap as percentage of GDP 
Unweighted means by region, 2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita.  
 
International surveys, such as the Gallup Poll, provide an opportunity to alleviate some 
of the typical comparability problems of household surveys, since survey design and 
questionnaires are identical across countries. However, as discussed above, these 
surveys have still small samples, and measurement errors are presumably large, given 
that only one income question is included. The correlation between headcount ratios 
computed with the Gallup Poll and PovcalNet is 0.32, significant at 2%, while the rank 
Spearman correlation is 0.61, significant at 1%.  
Figure 19 shows the cumulative density function in some regions of the world, based 
on Gallup data. There is first-order stochastic dominance of the Western Europe 
distribution over the rest, while the South Asian distribution is dominated by the 
rest.101 The curves of ECA and EAP cross each other, although they do so at high-
income levels.  
Figure 19 
Distribution functions  
 
Source: own estimates based on microdata from Gallup World Poll 2006. 
Note: cumulative distribution functions of per capita household income.  
 
                                                     
101 First-order stochastic dominance assures that the result of lower poverty in Western Europe is robust 
to the choice of poverty line and valid for a broad class of poverty measures (Atkinson, 1987). 
Region $ 1.25 $ 2
East Asia and Pacific 0.6 2.9
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.1 0.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.7 1.7
Middle East and North Africa 0.2 1.0
South Asia 1.2 6.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.1 23.0
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6. Poverty: trends  
In the last decades the developing world has made undeniable progress toward the 
goal of ending absolute poverty. The evidence suggests that the first goal of the 
Millennium Development Goals – to halve extreme poverty from 1990 to 2015 – was 
already met in 2010 for the aggregate of developing countries. However, the strong 
decline in global absolute poverty hides substantial heterogeneities across economies 
and over time. In this section we document and characterize trends in income poverty 
in the countries of the developing world since the early 1980s to 2010, and trace those 
changes to economic growth and distributive changes.102    
The literature on international poverty trends can be divided into two main strands. 
The first one makes comparisons based exclusively on household survey microdata. 
This ambitious road that requires access to surveys for many countries over time has 
been taken by several initiatives at the regional level, and by the World Bank at a 
global scale, mainly through the work of Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen. The 
second strand combines estimates of the national income distributions with GDP or 
aggregate consumption data drawn from National Accounts to anchor the mean. 
Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), Bhalla (2002), Karshenas (2003) and Sala-i-Martin 
(2006) are examples of this literature. In this section we mainly document the results 
of the first approach. 
  
6.1. Trends in income poverty  
Data from PovcalNet reveals a widespread fall in absolute income poverty in the 
developing countries over the last three decades (Figure 20). Only for a few nations 
poverty in 2010 was not lower than in 1981; that set includes some economies in 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and only a few in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The poverty decline in the 2000s was even more generalized: in 
only 8 out of 121 countries did poverty increase between 1999 and 2010 (5 in Sub-
Saharan Africa).  
 
                                                     
102 Chapter 12 in this volume also covers the issue of global poverty in the developing world. In our 
chapter the interest is more focused on the country trends, and then we make more use of unweighted 
statistics.  
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Figure 20 
Poverty headcount ratio  
Developing countries 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted 
$2-a-day line. 
 
The proportion of the population in the developing world living with less than $1.25 
per day decreased from 52% in 1981 to 20.8% in 2010, which implies a trend decline of 
around one point per year (Figure 21).103 This is a remarkable achievement that should 
not be overlooked. It would be hard to find other episodes in history where the extent 
of extreme poverty was reduced so massively in such a short period of time.  
 
Figure 21 
Poverty headcount ratio  
Weighted and unweighted means, developing countries, 1981-2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita. 
                                                     
103 The cumulative distribution function of 2010 lies always below the functions corresponding to all 
previous years (first-order stochastic dominance).   
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However, this extraordinary result should be put in perspective. First, even after this 
global social improvement one of every five persons in the developing world still lives 
in extremely deprived conditions (less than $1.25 a day), while four out of ten people 
have household per capita consumption levels lower than a frugal $2 per day.  
Second, the positive performance of China is key for the global result. Ignoring China, 
the poverty decline is less impressive: the headcount ratio fell 16 instead of 31 points 
in three decades (Table 14).104 In fact, when ignoring China it is not clear that the 
developing world could meet the MDG for poverty reduction in 2015. While the 
population-weighted mean of the poverty incidence rate dropped 31 points between 
1981 and 2010, the unweighted mean declined about 10 points, and the median went 
down just 8 points. The extreme poverty rate ($1.25) of a typical developing country 
was reduced from 29.5% in 1981 to 19% in 2010, which represents a fall of around a 
third of a point per year, a figure less impressive than the corresponding one for the 
global poverty rate (one point a year). In fact, this decline took place only since the 
late-1990s. A typical developing country did not experience any improvement for 
almost two decades: the unweighted poverty rate for the developing world was 29.5% 
in 1981, 29.8% in 1990 and 28.8% in 1996. From then on poverty declined more 
consistently, especially between 2002 and 2008, when for a typical developing 
economy the rate of poverty reduction was almost one point a year.     
 
Table 14 
Change in poverty measures (points) 
Developing countries, 1981-2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita. 
                                                     
104 When ignoring China the distribution of 2010 still dominates (first-order stochastic dominance) 1981 
although the distance between the two cumulative distributions is smaller. The curve for 1999 lies 
below 1981 and 1990 but only for poverty lines lower than $3 a day. 
Poverty measure
 1981-
1990
  1990-
1999
  1999-
2010
  1981-
2010 Poverty measure
 1981-
1990
  1990-
1999
  1999-
2010
  1981-
2010
Headcount - $1.25 line Poverty gap - $1.25 line
   Unweighted    Unweighted
       Mean 0.3 -1.9 -8.9 -10.5        Mean 0.2 -1.6 -4.2 -5.7
       Median 4.9 0.0 -12.9 -8.0        Median 0.3 0.3 -4.0 -3.4
   Weighted    Weighted
      Mean -9.0 -8.9 -13.4 -31.2       Mean -6.4 -3.7 -4.8 -14.9
      Without China -2.8 -3.1 -10.0 -15.9       Without China -1.6 -1.5 -3.7 -6.8
Headcount - $2 line Poverty gap - $2 line
   Unweighted    Unweighted
       Mean 0.7 -0.6 -11.0 -11.0        Mean 0.3 -1.5 -6.5 -7.7
       Median -0.3 -3.4 -17.1 -20.7        Median 2.3 0.8 -9.2 -6.1
   Weighted    Weighted
      Mean -4.9 -7.1 -16.6 -28.5       Mean -6.6 -5.4 -8.8 -20.8
      Without China -1.2 -1.1 -10.9 -13.1       Without China -1.7 -1.8 -6.4 -9.9
Headcount - $4 line Poverty gap - $4 line
   Unweighted    Unweighted
       Mean 0.9 2.2 -11.4 -8.3        Mean 0.4 -0.4 -9.0 -9.0
       Median 2.1 -2.1 -16.3 -16.3        Median -0.4 -1.4 -12.3 -14.1
   Weighted    Weighted
      Mean -1.7 -1.3 -14.0 -17.0       Mean -8.4 -4.6 -12.1 -25.1
      Without China -1.2 1.7 -8.3 -7.8       Without China -1.4 -0.5 -7.8 -9.7
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The fall in poverty appears less startling when using higher poverty lines. While the 
headcount ratio with the $1.25 line fell 60% from 1981 to 2010, it declined 41% when 
measured with the $2 line and 20% with the $4 line. In fact, while the MDG goal of 
halving $1.25-a-day poverty from the value in 1990 was already met in 2010, the 
assessment is different when using the $2 line: the headcount ratio in 2010 was about 
2/3 of the value in 1990.  
The performance of the developing world in terms of poverty reduction also looks 
much less spectacular when considering poverty counts, instead of the typical 
measures that are invariant to the size of the population. In fact, for the majority of 
the developing countries (63%) the number of poor people was higher in 2010 than in 
1981. Even during the booming 2000s the poverty count increased in 30% of the 
nations. The number of poor people was in the late 2000s only slightly lower than in 
the early 1980s (2,585 million in 1981 and 2,394 million in 2010 with the $2 line); 
ignoring China the poverty count actually increased in 422 million (from 1,613 to 
2,035). Some authors have suggested that the difference in the assessment of world 
poverty when alternatively using the headcount ratio or the number of poor people 
may be behind some of the controversies in the public debate about globalization and 
the social performance of the world in the last decades.105  
Since the calculation of global poverty with microdata is very cumbersome, and 
requires having a large number of comparable household surveys, some authors 
estimate the changes in poverty with National Accounts data, anchoring the mean of 
the income distribution to output or domestic consumption taken from National 
Accounts, using secondary distributive data and making assumptions about the 
functional form of the income distribution, typically the lognormal parameterization 
(Ahluwalia et al., 1979; Chotikapanich et al., 1997; Bhalla, 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2006; 
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 2009).106 This methodology allows ambitious calculations 
in terms of coverage, but it faces some obvious caveats as changes in National 
Accounts aggregates may be misleading proxies for changes in household per capita 
income, and the secondary distributive data in which the estimates are usually based 
are mined with several comparability problems.107 
According to the estimates by Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009) (PSM) using a 
sample of 191 countries, and distributive data from the WIID, world poverty rates ($2 
line) went down from 45.2% in 1970 to 37.8% in 1981, 24.9% in 1990, 16.8% in 1999, 
                                                     
105 See Reddy and Pogge (2010), Chen and Ravallion (2012) and Cockburn et al. (2012). 
106 It should be noticed that the World Bank poverty estimates also use National Accounts (NAS) data, 
although to a limited extent. For instance, for countries with only one household survey, poverty is 
estimated by applying the NAS consumption estimates to the available distribution data, assuming the 
Lorenz curve remains fixed. 
107 An intermediate alternative is proposed by Karshenas (2003), who calibrates survey means using 
National Accounts statistics. Calibrated survey means are read off the fitted curve for the mean of 
household survey consumption conditional on the NAS mean. 
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and 13% in 2006. That pattern implies a fall substantially faster than what is estimated 
with household surveys data alone in the 1980s and 1990s, but slower in the 2000s.108 
For instance, while for 2008 the magnitude of the poverty incidence rates in PSM for 
the $3 line is similar than in PovcalNet with the $1.25 line, the declines have been 
different: in PSM the headcount ratio fell at annual 2.6% and 3.5% in the 1980s and 
1990s, respectively, while the rates were 2.1% and 2.5% with PovcalNet data. Instead, 
in the 2000s poverty fell at annual 3.1% in PSM and at annual 4.4% in PovcalNet.  
 
6.2. Decomposing poverty changes 
Researchers frequently use decompositions of changes in poverty into growth and 
redistribution effects in order to characterize poverty trends.109 The growth effect 
refers to the poverty change between two years that would have occurred if the mean 
income had changed as it did, but the shape of the distribution had stayed fixed. On 
the other hand, the redistribution effect records the poverty change between two 
years that would have occurred if the shape of the distribution had changed in the way 
it did, but the mean had remained fixed. Of course, this is just a mechanical exercise, 
as indicators of economic growth, and changes in inequality and poverty are just three 
different ways of aggregate information on income dynamics, and therefore they are 
all jointly determined by the general equilibrium of the economy. In that sense the 
decompositions are helpful to illustrate the way incomes have changed and affected 
poverty, but they are silent on the fundamental factors underlying poverty changes, 
and on the policies recommended to reduce deprivations more effectively.  
The change in the growth-inequality-poverty triangle was very different in the 2000s 
compared to the previous decade. Table 15 illustrates this difference showing the 
unweighted mean of the growth and redistribution effects of changes in poverty for a 
sample of 76 developing countries with information on deciles shares in PovcalNet.110 
The mild fall in the poverty headcount ratio ($2 line) in the 1990s can be decomposed 
into a poverty-decreasing growth effect that outweighed a poverty-increasing 
redistribution effect. On average (unweighted) mean consumption grew at an annual 
0.2 per cent, and the Gini increased about 0.3 points per year, implying a very modest 
decline in poverty. In contrast, in the 2000s both effects contributed to a falling 
poverty. A robust increase of mean consumption (more than 3 per cent a year) and a 
slow fall in inequality (around 0.1 Gini points a year) combined to yield a substantial 
reduction in indicators of material deprivation. The growth effect was particularly 
large, accounting for 90 per cent of the fall in the headcount ratio ($2 line). This result 
                                                     
108 Dhongde and Minoiu (2010) explore several factors behind the different results in Chen and Ravallion 
(2010) and Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009). 
109 See Datt and Ravallion (1992), Kakwani and Subbarao (1990), Kakwani (2000) and Mahmoudi (2001) 
for different proposals. 
110 Since the decompositions could be carried out changing the base year, the table shows the averages 
over the two exercises. To obtain the results we use lineal approximations to the Pen curve based on 
information on mean consumption per capita by decile from PovcalNet.  
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does not mean that distributive changes are not important, but instead that they have 
not been the main drivers of poverty reduction in the past.  
 
Table 15 
Decomposition of poverty changes  
Developing countries, 1990-2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from PovcalNet.  
Note: the columns show unweighted means across a sample of 76 developing countries of the change in 
poverty headcount ratio ($2 line), and the growth and redistribution effects from the poverty change 
decomposition. 
 
6.3. The cost of closing the poverty gap 
Although still a challenging problem, eliminating absolute extreme income poverty is 
an increasingly affordable target. Based on PovcalNet data we computed the 
population-weighted poverty gap index in the developing world as a share of global 
GDP. This fraction, that indicates the fiscal effort required to end poverty in a scenario 
of perfect targeting, absent behavioral responses, has been substantially falling over 
time as poverty decreased and global GDP went up. The resources needed to close the 
poverty gap with the $1.25 line as a share of global GDP declined from 1.3% in 1981 to 
0.2% in 2010 (the corresponding values for the $2 line are 3.6% and 1%).111 As a share 
of the GDP in the developing world the cost of closing the poverty gap fell from 1.9% in 
1981 to 0.4% in 2010 (5.4% and 1.8% for the $2 line).    
Kanbur and Sumner (2011) highlight the fact that while in 1990 over 90 per cent of the 
world’s extremely poor people ($1.25) lived in countries classified as low-income 
countries (LICs), by the late 2000s this share dropped to less than 30 per cent. From 
the fact that most of the world’s poor live in middle-income countries with the 
domestic financial capacity to end at least extreme poverty, Sumner (2012) concludes 
that poverty reduction is increasingly becoming a domestic issue of national 
distribution and domestic political economy, rather than primarily an aid and 
international issue. Table 16 suggests than on average (unweighted) across developing 
countries the redistributive national effort to end extreme poverty under perfect 
targeting fell from 8.2% of GDP in 1981 to 4% in 2010. The median value is much 
lower, and has fallen from 1.9% in 1981 to 0.5% in 2010. The third column shows the 
share of countries where the cost of eliminating extreme income poverty is less than 1 
GDP point. That share substantially increased in the 2000s, from 41.3% in 1999 to 
55.4% in 2010. Similarly, the share of countries for which closing the poverty gap is 
                                                     
111 This computation assumes zero poverty in the high-income countries, when deprivation is measured 
with the international lines.   
Actual
change Growth Redistribution
1990-1999 -0.3 -1.5 1.2
1999-2010 -10.1 -9.0 -1.1
1990-2010 -10.5 -10.4 -0.1
Effects 
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fiscally very burdensome (in the table more than 3 GDP points) fell from more than 
50% in 1990 to about 30% in 2010. Sumner (2012) reports similar trends, although a 
lower proportion of countries with poverty gap/GDP less than 1%. Ravallion (2010) 
also notes that most middle-income countries would require very small additional 
taxation to end poverty. 
 
Table 16 
Poverty gap as share of GDP 
Mean, median, share of countries with gap/GDP less than 1% and greater than 3%  
Developing countries, 1981-2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita. Unweighted statistics. 
 
6.4. Regional trends   
The patterns in income poverty over time have been heterogeneous across the 
geographic regions of the developing world (Table 17). At least three facts are worth 
stressing: (i) the remarkable decline in poverty in Asia over the last three decades, (ii) 
the lack of significant progress in the rest of the regions in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
(iii) the generalized fall in poverty in the 2000s.  
Arguably, the main fact about poverty dynamics in the last three decades has been the 
noteworthy decline in Asia. The share of people living with less than $2 a day went 
down from 92.4% to 29.7% between 1981 and 2010 in East Asia and Pacific, and from 
87.2% to 66.7% in South Asia. The performance of EAP is enhanced by the presence of 
China, but also the unweighted mean dramatically fell in this region (from 70.4% in 
1981 to 38.4% in 2010). The fall in the unweighted mean was similar in South Asia 
(from 80.3% to 43.5%). Almost all countries in Asia experienced drops in income 
poverty over the period 1981-2010. The reductions were on average larger in the 
2000s than in the previous decades. For instance, in South Asia the unweighted mean 
fell 5.6 points in the 1980s, 10.9 in the 1990s and 20.4 in the 2000s.  
In the rest of the developing world the performance was weak and even negative in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Income poverty rose in Latin America in the 1980s, in Eastern 
Mean Median
% less             
1 GDP point
% more             
3 GDP points Mean Median
% less             
1 GDP point
% more             
3 GDP points
1981 8.2 1.9 42.4 45.7 19.9 5.4 22.9 60.4
1984 8.4 2.2 41.3 45.7 20.5 6.6 19.8 60.4
1987 8.2 2.3 39.1 46.7 19.9 7.1 20.8 60.4
1990 8.1 3.3 39.1 51.1 19.6 7.0 24.0 59.4
1993 9.2 2.4 40.2 47.8 22.0 7.5 25.0 59.4
1996 9.2 2.0 40.2 42.4 21.6 7.3 24.0 60.4
1999 6.9 2.0 41.3 39.1 17.9 5.9 25.0 60.4
2002 5.9 1.4 41.3 40.2 15.7 4.8 27.1 58.3
2005 5.2 1.0 48.9 35.9 14.0 3.7 32.3 55.2
2008 4.3 0.7 50.0 33.7 11.6 3.0 40.6 50.0
2010 4.0 0.5 55.4 31.5 11.1 3.0 42.7 50.0
Poverty line $1.25 Poverty line $2
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Europe and Central Asia in the 1990s, and in Sub-Saharan Africa in both decades. In 
contrast, all regions experienced falling poverty in the 2000s. The reductions were 
large, and in general outweighed the weak performance of the previous decades. For 
instance, on average (unweighted) income poverty ($2 line) went down 72% in ECA, 
43% in MENA, 34% in LAC and 12% in SSA. The proportion of countries where the 
headcount ratio fell more than 5% in the 2000s is above 90% in all these regions, with 
the exception of SSA, where the corresponding proportion is 66%.  
 
Table 17   
Poverty headcount ratio, developing world 1981-2010 
Weighted and unweighted means  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
 
The contrast between Asia and the rest of the developing world in terms of poverty 
reduction is even more dramatic when the calculations are carried out anchoring the 
mean of the income distribution to GDP from National Accounts. Figure 22 shows 
regional estimates taken from Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009), where the sharp 
declines in poverty in East and South Asia stand out. According to these estimates 
there would be poverty convergence across the regions of the developing world, with 
the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
 
  
1981 1990 1999 2010
Unweighted mean; $1.25 line
   East Asia and Pacific 53.4 44.3 33.3 17.9
   Eastern Europe and Central Asia 4.0 4.5 7.5 1.4
   Latin America and the Caribbean 13.2 14.4 13.7 8.6
   Middle East and North Africa 10.3 7.2 6.8 3.5
   South Asia 59.7 51.3 37.8 17.6
   Sub-Saharan Africa 49.3 54.0 52.2 41.5
Unweighted mean; $2 line
   East Asia and Pacific 70.4 65.8 56.2 38.4
   Eastern Europe and Central Asia 10.1 10.2 17.0 4.8
   Latin America and the Caribbean 24.3 25.9 23.8 15.6
   Middle East and North Africa 28.6 24.0 23.5 13.5
   South Asia 80.3 74.7 63.9 43.5
   Sub-Saharan Africa 67.1 71.5 71.0 62.2
Population-weighted mean; $1.25 line
   East Asia and Pacific 77.2 56.2 35.6 12.5
   Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.9 1.9 3.8 0.7
   Latin America and the Caribbean 11.9 12.3 11.9 5.5
   Middle East and North Africa 9.6 5.7 5.0 2.4
   South Asia 61.1 53.8 45.1 31.0
   Sub-Saharan Africa 51.4 56.5 57.9 48.5
Population-weighted mean; $2 line
   East Asia and Pacific 92.4 81.0 61.7 29.7
   Eastern Europe and Central Asia 8.3 6.9 12.1 2.3
   Latin America and the Caribbean 23.7 22.5 22.0 10.4
   Middle East and North Africa 30.0 23.4 21.9 12.0
   South Asia 87.2 83.6 77.8 66.7
   Sub-Saharan Africa 72.2 75.9 77.5 69.9
Alvaredo-Gasparini 
 72 
Figure 22 
Poverty headcount ratio  
Developing countries, 1970-2006 
 
Source: Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009). 
Note: poverty line $2 a day. 
 
Regions have been different in terms of the growth-inequality-poverty triangle (Table 
18). The growth effect was strong in Asia dwarfing a much smaller (and sometimes 
poverty-increasing) redistribution effect. The increase in poverty in ECA in the 1990s is 
associated with both negative growth and inequality rise, while the fall in poverty in 
the following decade is mostly accounted by neutral positive growth. In Latin America 
growth contributed in both decades, but only in the 2000s did the redistribution effect 
become poverty-reducing. Finally, in Africa (MENA and SSA) the growth effect in the 
2000s was the major contributing factor to the fall in poverty.   
 
Table 18 
Decomposition of poverty changes  
Developing countries 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from PovcalNet.  
Note: the columns show unweighted means across a sample of 76 developing countries of the change in 
the poverty headcount ratio ($2 line), and the growth and redistribution effects from the poverty 
change decomposition. 
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East Asia South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Middle East and North Africa
Actual Actual
change Growth Redistribution change Growth Redistribution
EAP MENA
   1990-1999 -10.5 -10.7 0.2    1990-1999 -1.5 -0.6 -1.0
   1999-2010 -19.4 -19.2 -0.2    1999-2010 -10.1 -8.0 -2.1
   1990-2010 -30.0 -30.3 0.3    1990-2010 -11.6 -8.4 -3.3
ECA SA
   1990-1999 8.6 6.1 2.5    1990-1999 -9.0 -10.9 2.0
   1999-2010 -11.5 -10.5 -1.0    1999-2010 -13.2 -12.0 -1.1
   1990-2010 -2.9 -3.9 1.0    1990-2010 -22.1 -23.3 1.2
LAC SSA
   1990-1999 -3.2 -5.3 2.1    1990-1999 -1.8 -1.4 -0.4
   1999-2010 -7.9 -5.3 -2.6    1999-2010 -5.9 -6.0 0.0
   1990-2010 -11.1 -10.2 -0.9    1990-2010 -7.7 -7.8 0.0
Effects Effects 
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In the rest of this section we take a closer look at the changes in poverty reported by 
the literature in each geographic region of the developing world.  
 
East Asia and Pacific 
As mentioned above, East Asia and Pacific has achieved an impressive record in terms 
of poverty reduction. The fall in the indicators of material deprivation has been strong, 
sustained over the two last decades and widespread across countries.112 The poverty 
headcount ratio with the $2 line fell from 92.4% in 1981 to 81% in 1990, 61.7% in 1999 
and 29.7% in 2010.  
China’s progress against absolute poverty was a key factor behind this dynamics 
(World Bank, 2009; Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Minoiu and Reddy, 2008). Rural areas 
accounted for the bulk of the gains to the poor, although migration to urban areas 
helped; agriculture played a far more important role than the secondary or tertiary 
sources of GDP, mainly from the efficiency gains after the decollectivization process. 
Ravallion and Chen (2007) claim that “the halving of the national poverty rate in the 
first few years of the 1980s was largely attributable to picking these blow-lying fruits of 
agrarian reform”. Provinces starting with relatively high inequality saw slower progress 
against poverty, due both to lower growth and a lower growth elasticity of poverty 
reduction. While in 1990 the incidence of poverty in China was roughly 25 points 
higher than in the rest of the developing world, by the end of the 2000s, it had fallen 
more than 10 points below the average.113 
Between 1990 and 2010 the headcount ratio fell from 60% to 12% in China ($1.25 
line), and from 54% to 18% in Indonesia, the two most populated countries in the 
region. The rest of the East Asian economies experienced similar patterns. The 
headcount ratio dropped from 58% to 15% in Cambodia, from 12% to 0.4% in Thailand, 
and from 73% to 14% in Vietnam. The reductions were less spectacular, but anyway 
significant in the Pacific countries (Micronesia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor-
Leste). According to the Asian Development Bank (2012), and using the national lines, 
poverty declined in all EAP economies except Mongolia, Micronesia, Samoa, Timor-
Leste, Tonga and Tuvalu. With respect to the poverty reduction target of the 
Millennium Development Goals, of the ten economies for which data are available, six 
have achieved the poverty target, and Cambodia is very close to reaching it by 2015. 
Lao PDR, Philippines, and Timor-Leste are progressing more slowly toward that goal. 
  
                                                     
112 See Ahuja et al. (1997) and Nissanke and Thorbecke (2010) as examples of a vast literature. 
113 During the early and mid-1990s poverty declined substantially, but then in the late 1990s to the early 
2000s the downward trend stalled. Li et al. (2013) argue that further reductions in poverty became more 
challenging due to several factors, for example, the fact that a high proportion of the remaining poverty 
was geographically dispersed and transient, and also because poverty had become less responsive to 
macroeconomic growth (World Bank, 2009). Policies adopted after 2002, such as the minimum living 
guarantee program, the new rural cooperative medical system, and the new rural pension system, have 
addressed some of these factors.  
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Eastern Europe and Central Asia  
The evidence clearly suggests that poverty in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
increased during the 1990s and decreased during the 2000s. The collapse of output in 
many of these countries following the dismantling of the Soviet Union, along with 
hyperinflation that wiped out savings, resulted in a dramatic drop in living standards 
for the majority of people and the emergence of poverty as a major issue.114 However, 
according to Simai (2006) poverty in the region was not a new phenomenon: most of 
the countries began their transformation with extensive hidden unemployment and at 
least one-tenth of its population below the subsistence level. The transition also 
involved setbacks in non-monetary dimensions of wellbeing. Past achievements in 
social welfare came under pressure, the most striking being the reduction in life 
expectancy: in 1995, life expectancy for males in the Russian Federation was just 58 
years, 10 years less than that of men in China (UN, 2004). 
Table 17 reminds the reader that poverty rates in these countries have always been 
much lower than in the other developing regions, irrespective of the line considered 
and of the weighted or unweighted averages, and despite the fact that low-income CIS 
(Georgia, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Armenia, Kygryz Republic, Tajikistan) display figures 
well above the regional mean. When growth resumed after the Russian crisis in 1998, 
poverty started to fall.115 It was not until 2004 that the region as a whole returned to 
the level of GDP recorded in 1990 (World Bank, 2005). Much of the poverty reduction 
initially occurred in the populous middle-income countries (Kazakhstan, Russian 
Federation, Ukraine), but eventually it spread almost everywhere. Scholars have 
identified four main (non-independent) explanations for the poverty dynamics: (i) the 
positive growth in output and wages; (ii) the decline in inequality, with incomes of 
poorer households increasing faster than average in some countries (CIS) but not in 
others (Poland, Romania); (iii) the increasing role of public transfers, with benefits 
improving in coverage and adequacy; and (iv) private remittances, which in many cases 
far exceeded public funding. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Poverty estimates in Latin America, available since the 1970s, were always mostly 
based on income, not consumption.116 Despite the fact that statistics were initially 
weak, there is agreement among researchers that during the 1970s economic growth 
pushed poverty down in the region (Altimir, 1979, 1996). In contrast, the “lost decade" 
of the 1980s was characterized by recurrent crises and output stagnation, that brought 
about a weak social performance. Latin American economic growth resumed in the 
                                                     
114 Poverty in Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics pre-1990 is discussed at some length in Atkinson 
and Micklewright (1992). 
115 For an analysis of the growth elasticities of poverty reduction, see World Bank (2005), chapter 2. 
116 In the Caribbean poverty is estimated based on consumption expenditures, but surveys are still 
scarce, so poverty changes are difficult to monitor.  
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1990s, but in the context of growing inequalities, a combination that resulted in a 
modest decline in poverty (Londoño and Székely, 2000). The exceptional economic 
conditions in the 2000s and the consolidation of more ambitious social policies implied 
a sharp drop in poverty indicators in that decade. Gasparini et al. (2013) estimate that 
the income poverty headcount ratio ($2.5 line) fell from 36% in the early 1970s to 
27.3% in 1980, slowly increased to reach 27.8% in 1992, mildly decreased to 24.9% in 
2003, and was reduced dramatically to 16.3% by 2009.117 The number of poor people 
in the region is estimated to have fallen from 119 million in 1992 to 89 million in 2009 
(Gasparini et al., 2013). Other indicators of income poverty and of various types of 
material deprivation are consistent with these results. Data from SEDLAC confirms that 
the reduction in poverty continued in the period 2009-2013, despite a deceleration in 
the GDP growth rates. The improvements in social indicators in the 2000s have been 
linked to at least two factors: on the one hand, most of the region’s economies 
experienced robust growth together with upswings in employment and labor income; 
on the other, all countries boosted social spending and put ambitious social protection 
systems into place or expanded the scope of their existing systems (López Calva and 
Lustig, 2010; Cruces and Gasparini, 2012).  
The performance in terms of poverty reduction has been heterogeneous across the 
regions in Latin America. While Central America experienced a slow decline in income 
deprivation over the last two decades, in the rest of the regions the rapid poverty fall 
of the 2000s contrasts with the sluggish or even negative performance of the 1990s.118 
More than half of the population in Latin America lives in Brazil or Mexico. After a 
decline in the early 1990s, income poverty in Brazil remained stable for about a 
decade: the poverty incidence rate with the $2.5 line was 27.8% in 1995 and 27.1% in 
2003. After that plateau, the country experienced a fast and sustained reduction in 
income poverty, reaching 13.9% in 2010. The Mexican economy was hit by a serious 
crisis in the mid-1990s (the so-called Tequila crisis) that raised income poverty from 
17.8% in 1992 to 43.4% in 1995 (SEDLAC data, $2.5 line). From that peak, income 
poverty initiated a consistent decline to reach a value of 12% in 2006, with no gains in 
the second half of the 2000s.     
 
Middle East and North Africa  
As discussed in section 4 it is useful to divide the last four decades in MENA into three 
periods. The first one, spanning until the mid-1980s, was characterized by strong 
economic growth: the average per capita income growth for the region between 1975 
                                                     
117 Estimates are based on SEDLAC statistics, Londoño and Székely (2000), Wodon et al. (2001) and 
official poverty estimates from all countries in Latin America.  
118 SEDLAC data indicate that using the international poverty line of $2.5, the average (unweighted) 
poverty rate in Southern South America increased from 17.7% in 1992 to 18.5% in 2003, and then 
dropped to 9.1% by 2010. In the same period the average poverty rate in the Andean region first rose 
from 30.2% to 33%, and then declined to 17.5%. In contrast, poverty in Central America fell more 
uniformly over the two decades: 33.3% in 1992, 28.6% in 2003 and 23.1% in 2010. 
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and 1984 was over 4.5%. Adams and Page (2003) argue that given MENA´s relatively 
equal income distribution, this economic growth had a powerful impact on reducing 
poverty in the region. However, assessing that progress is difficult since pre-1985 
household surveys are only available for Tunisia and Egypt. Iqbal (2006) reports that in 
Tunisia poverty fell from 51% in 1965 to 16% in 1985, while Egypt’s achievement was 
also impressive, with poverty declining from 82% to 53% between 1975 and 1985. 
Page (2007) estimates a fall in the incidence of poverty ($2 line) in the region from 57% 
in the late 1970s to 22% in the early 1990s.  
The second period, covering the late 1980s and most of the 1990s, was characterized 
by a sluggish economic performance, in part due to low prices for hydrocarbons, 
declining remittances and aid flows, as well as a low payoff to the reforms that were 
implemented. On average for the developing MENA countries, real per capita incomes 
went up by less than 1.5% per year. The proportion of those living with less than $2 
per day stayed roughly unchanged around 22% for a decade (PovcalNet). Iqbal (2006) 
reports that “by 2001, approximately 52 million people were poor, an increase in 
absolute numbers of approximately 11.5 million people, compared with the situation 
in 1987”. The 1990s were a lost decade for economic growth and poverty reduction in 
the developing economies of the MENA region (Page, 2007).  
The downward pattern in poverty appeared to have resumed in the 2000s. The 
incidence of poverty ($2 line) fell from 22% in 1999 to 12% in 2010. According to 
PovcalNet data the number of people living with less than $2 a day increased by 7 
million in the 1990s, and then was reduced by 20 million in the 2000s (from 60 to 40 
million). While in the 1990s poverty went down in a third of the MENA countries, in 
the 2000s it went down in all economies, with the possible exception of Yemen.  
 
South Asia  
South Asia achieved impressive economic growth in the past fifteen years. Since 1996 
until the recent global crisis, GDP growth in the region exceeded 5 percent per year. As 
a consequence, poverty rates were considerably reduced. In Bangladesh, India and 
Nepal, absolute poverty (headcount ratio, $1.25 line) fell by 18, 15 and 43 percentage 
points, respectively, between 1996 and 2010. In Pakistan, it fell by 22 percentage 
points between 2002 and 2010. Devarajan and Nabi (2006) optimistically expected the 
region to have single-digit poverty rates in 2015 if growth rates accelerated to 10 
percent per year. This has indeed happened already in Sri Lanka (where poverty 
dropped from 17% in 1996 to 4% in 2010) as well as in Maldives (where, according to 
the 2006 census, about 1 per cent of the population was living on less than $1 a day). 
Growth has been instrumental in reducing poverty rates, but, as Ghani (2010) pointed 
out from a gloomier perspective, poverty rates were not falling fast enough to reduce 
the total number of poor people. Those living on less than $1.25 a day increased from 
549 million in 1981 to 595 million in 2005. In India, where around three-quarters of 
these poor live, the number increased from 420 million in 1981 to 455 million in 2005 
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(Ravallion et al. 2009). The situation seems to have slightly improved according to the 
most recent observations.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
The economic and social performance of Sub-Saharan African countries has been 
frustrating. Five decades after most nations gained independence, poverty is still at 
very high levels in SSA, in fact the highest in the world. Fortunately, it seems that 
finally, after years of impoverished economic performance, the last decade shows 
some signs of improvement. Based on figures from PovcalNet, the incidence of poverty 
increased between 1981 and 1999 from 51% to 58% for the $1.25 per day line, and 
from 72% to 77% for the $2 line (the unweighted statistics are not very different).119 
Because of the increase in population the number of people living with less than $1.25 
a day almost doubled in Sub-Saharan Africa during those years, from 205 million to 377 
million. These results are even more disappointing when compared to the rest of the 
developing world. The share of the world’s poor living in Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 
11% in 1981 to 22% in 1999. Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003) find that the SSA poverty 
rate was stable in the 1970s, around a value of 49%, and soared in the 1980s and early 
1990s reaching 60% in 1995, following the deterioration of aggregate per capita 
income in the region. They report a nearly 50% reduction in the worldwide poverty 
rate between 1980 and 2000, that contrast with a 27% increase in SSA. 
Following the dismal performance of the 1980s and early 1990s, SSA witnessed some 
economic and social progress. Poverty declined considerably from their heights of the 
mid-1990s; in fact the reduction in extreme poverty from that date to the late 2000s 
was similar than in the rest of the developing world, excluding China. Chen and 
Ravallion (2012) stressed the fact that for the first time since 1981 the share of people 
in Sub-Saharan Africa living below $1.25 a day was less than 50%. Changes in poverty 
have been closely linked to economic growth. According to Fosu (2010), poverty has 
declined in SSA by about 0.5 percentage points per year since the mid-1990s, quite 
comparable with South Asia’s record. Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovskiy (2010) estimate that 
African poverty has been falling steadily since 1995. According to these authors the 
African poverty rate in 2006 was 31.8%, 30 per cent lower than in 1995, and 28 per 
cent lower than in 1990. The decline in poverty in the 2000s was quite extended: as 
reported above, 2/3 of the SSA countries in PovcalNet experienced reductions larger 
than 5%. Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovskiy (2010) find that “poverty fell for both landlocked 
as well as coastal countries; for mineral-rich as well as mineral-poor countries; for 
countries with favorable or with unfavorable agriculture; for countries regardless of 
colonial origin; and for countries with below or above median slave exports per capita 
during the African slave trade. Hence, the substantial decline in poverty is not driven 
by any particular country or set of countries”. However, Fosu (2009) highlights the 
considerable heterogeneity across country experiences. For example, while high 
                                                     
119 According to the $4 line, more than 90 per cent of the SSA population is actually considered poor. 
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economic growth in Botswana has been transformed to only a minimal decline in 
poverty, Ghana has succeeded in translating its relatively modest growth to 
considerable poverty reduction. Fosu (2009) attributes this contrast to the difference 
in the levels of income inequality between the two countries.  
Despite the encouraging signs of progress in the fight against poverty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Chen and Ravallion (2012) alert that the lags in survey data availability and 
problems of comparability and coverage rise up concerns about how robust this 
positive trend will prove to be.  
 
6.5. Poverty convergence 
Given the heterogeneity among economies in terms of social improvement, a natural 
question is whether countries starting out with a high incidence of material 
deprivation tend to be the ones with higher rates of poverty reduction, i.e. whether 
there is poverty convergence (Ravallion, 2012).120 Figure 23 suggests some signs of 
poverty convergence in absolute terms but not in proportionate terms.121 The 1981 
poverty level ($2 line) is negatively correlated with the annualized change over the 
period 1981-2010, but not with the proportionate change (annualized log difference). 
In the first panel the regression line has a slope of  -0.009 with a t-ratio of -4.51, based 
on a robust (White) standard error. This result means that on average the absolute fall 
in poverty has been larger in countries with higher poverty incidence, but since the 
difference across countries is small, there is absence of poverty convergence in 
proportionate terms.  
 
Figure 23 
Poverty convergence among developing countries  
1981-2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted 
$2-a-day per person line. 
                                                     
120 The use of the term poverty convergence in this context is not entirely transparent. Another (more 
trivial) alternative would be assessing whether poverty measures converge towards zero, simply 
checking that poverty changes are negative. 
121 The analysis is restricted to countries with initial poverty above 5%.   
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The results for other poverty indices, lines and time periods are similar (Table 19). The 
coefficients for the absolute change in poverty are negative but small, while the 
coefficients for the proportionate change are in general positive, although in most 
cases non-significant.122  
 
Table 19 
Poverty convergence among developing countries 
Coefficients of initial poverty on a poverty change regression  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis.  
*=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1%. 
 
Ravallion (2012) argues that the lack of poverty convergence (in proportionate terms), 
despite evidence for mean convergence and for the poverty-reduction impact of 
growth, suggests that the dynamic processes for growth and poverty reduction depend 
directly on the initial level of poverty. He shows evidence on two adverse effects of 
being a country with high poverty levels: first, these countries tend to grow at a slower 
pace, controlling for the initial mean, and second a high poverty rate implies lower 
“productivity” of economic growth in terms of poverty reduction (lower poverty-
growth elasticity).   
 
6.6. Poverty and growth 
The dynamics of poverty are closely related to income growth. The economic literature 
has gathered abundant evidence supporting the fact that absolute poverty tends to fall 
                                                     
122 The first panel in Figure 23 suggests an increase in the dispersion of absolute changes at higher 
values of the initial poverty level. A quantile regression analysis confirms that the slope of the regression 
line is negative and significant for the lower quantiles (the high-performers in terms of poverty 
reduction), and statistically non-significant for the higher quantiles. The systematic difference in the 
slopes across quantiles suggests that poverty convergence depends on factors beyond the initial poverty 
level.  
Index Poverty line
Absolute 
changes
Proportionate 
changes
Absolute 
changes
Proportionate 
changes
Absolute 
changes
Proportionate 
changes
Headcount $ 1.25 -0.017 0.001 -0.018 0.010 -0.016 0.023
(0.002)*** (0.004) (0.003)*** (0.004)* (0.004)*** (0.006)***
Headcount $ 2 -0.009 0.006 -0.008 0.016 -0.008 0.028
(0.002)*** (0.004) (0.002)*** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.007)***
Poverty gap $ 1.25 -0.021 -0.007 -0.026 -0.001 -0.024 0.014
(0.002)*** (0.004) (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.005)*** (0.007)**
Poverty gap $ 2 -0.016 0.001 -0.018 0.010 -0.016 0.024
(0.002)*** (0.004) (0.003)*** (0.005)* (0.004)*** (0.008)***
Squared poverty gap $ 1.25 -0.024 -0.013 -0.032 -0.008 -0.030 0.006
(0.002)*** (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.006) (0.007)*** (0.006)
Squared poverty gap $ 2 -0.020 -0.005 -0.024 0.002 -0.022 0.014
(0.002)*** (0.004) (0.003)*** (0.004) (0.005)*** (0.005)***
1990-20101981-2010 1999-2010
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with economic growth.123 Moreover, the longer the growth spells under consideration, 
the larger the share of the variance in poverty that is accounted for by the growth 
component (Ferreira, 2010). Figure 24 illustrates this relationship by showing poverty 
along with two alternatives measures of mean income: per capita gross national 
income (GNI) constructed from National Accounts, and per capita consumption 
obtained from household surveys. The figure shows the unweighted mean of these 
variables among developing countries in the period 1981-2010. On average, the 
economic performance of the developing countries was weak in the 1980s and early 
1990s, hindering the perspectives of poverty reduction. Since the mid-1990s economic 
growth resumed in most countries in the developing world, a process that accelerated 
in the 2000s, leading to a sustained decrease in all measures of income poverty. At the 
end of the decade that pattern was slowed down, but not halted, by the poor 
economic performance of several developing countries associated to the international 
crisis.  
 
Figure 24 
Per capita GNI, per capita consumption and poverty headcount ratio  
Unweighted mean, developing countries, 1981-2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: per capita gross national income in constant 2005 PPP dollars, per capita consumption from 
household surveys in constant 2005 dollars. Unweighted averages across developing countries, series 
displayed with mean=100. Headcount poverty ratio $2-a-day line, unweighted averages across 
developing countries.  
 
Figure 25 is another illustration of the relationship between poverty reduction and 
economic growth. The figure shows that the change in poverty is closely negatively 
related to economic growth, either in per capita consumption expenditures drawn 
                                                     
123 See Chen and Ravallion (1997), World Bank (2000), Ravallion (2001, 2007, 2012), Dollar and Kraay 
(2002), Fields (2002), Bourguignon (2003), Besley and Burguess (2003), Kraay (2006), Fosu (2011) as 
examples of a large literature.  
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from household surveys or in GNI from NAS. Notice that in both panels the fitted line 
approximately crosses the (0,0) point.   
 
Figure 25 
Growth and poverty reduction in the developing countries, 1981-2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013). 
Note: the horizontal axis shows the annual growth rate between 1981 and 2010 in per capita 
consumption from household surveys in constant 2005 dollars (panel 1) and in per capita gross national 
income in constant 2005 PPP dollars (panel 2); the vertical axis shows the annual growth change in the 
poverty headcount ratio ($1.25 line) in the same period. The size of each circle is proportional to the 
country population in 2010.  
 
Since the positive correlation between poverty reduction and growth is a well-
established result, research in this area is mainly focused on estimating the magnitude 
of the corresponding elasticity, an issue that may have relevant policy implications. “If 
(the elasticity) is reasonably high, then poverty reduction strategies almost exclusively 
relying on economic growth are probably justified. If it is low, however, ambitious 
poverty reduction strategies might have to combine both economic growth and some 
redistribution” (Bourguignon, 2003). The growth elasticity of poverty reduction is 
typically estimated by regressing the annualized proportional change in a poverty 
indicator against the annualized growth rate of mean income (per capita income or 
consumption from surveys, or per capita GDP, GNI, or aggregate private consumption 
from NAS) in a sample of growth spells. In a regression without controls the resulting 
coefficient is the total elasticity, as opposed to a partial elasticity that can be obtained 
by holding inequality and other factors constant.  
Based on a dataset for 67 countries over the period from 1981 to 1994, and using the 
$1 line, Ravallion and Chen (1997) find a central estimate for the poverty-growth 
elasticity of -3.1. Values estimated by other authors are somewhat lower (in absolute 
terms): around -2 in World Bank (2000), -1.6 in Bourguignon (2003), -2.6 in Adams 
(2004), and -1.8 in Ferreira and Ravallion (2009). More recently, Ravallion (2012) 
reports an elasticity of −1.4 for the $1.25 line. The elasticity is lower when using the 
growth rate of consumption per capita from NAS (−0.8), and also lower when using a 
higher poverty line. The confidence intervals around the regression coefficient are 
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typically wide. Ravallion (2007) reports that the 95% confidence interval implies that 
for a poverty level of 40%, an annual growth rate of 2% is consistent with poverty 
reductions ranging from 1% to 7%. 
Estimates of the total growth elasticity of poverty reduction over the period 1981-2010 
obtained with the latest version of PovcalNet data are shown in Table 20.124 All the 
elasticities are negative and significant at 1%. The growth elasticity of poverty 
reduction, as measured by the proportion of individuals below $1.25 a day, is around -
1.5. The results in Table 20 confirm that elasticities are lower in absolute value when 
considering a higher poverty line. The result of lower elasticities using GNI from 
National Accounts holds but only until the 2000s, suggesting a change in the relative 
trends between consumption reported in household surveys and output estimated in 
NAS. In general, the absolute value of the elasticities estimated with both sources have 
increased in the 2000s compared to previous decades, suggesting that growth was 
better translated to the poor in that period of falling inequality. For instance, while the 
elasticity using the $1.25 line and consumption per capita was -1.53 for the period 
1981-2010, it amounted to -1.83 when restricting the analysis to the 2000s.  
 
Table 20 
Total poverty-growth elasticities 
Developing countries 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: all elasticities are significant at 1% level. 
  
So far, we have reported total elasticities, which can be seen as summary measures of 
the co-movements of poverty and growth. The literature has tried to improve this 
characterization by adding other variables into the analysis, typically measures of 
inequality and development. The empirical evidence supports the intuition that higher 
inequality tends to reduce the absolute value of the elasticity, by shifting the gains 
                                                     
124 The sample includes 725 spells in 76 countries for which consistent information for the whole period 
is available. Results do not significantly vary when we restrict the analysis to more recent periods which 
allows a larger sample of countries.       
1981 - 2010 1990-2010 1999-2010 1981 - 2010 1990-2010 1999-2010
1.25 -1.53 -1.56 -1.83 -1.46 -1.51 -2.16
2 -1.39 -1.41 -1.68 -1.17 -1.19 -1.91
4 -1.30 -1.38 -1.10 -0.78 -0.81 -1.21
1.25 -1.75 -1.77 -1.87 -1.44 -1.47 -2.09
2 -1.50 -1.47 -1.85 -1.35 -1.30 -1.83
4 -1.41 -1.47 -1.39 -0.95 -0.98 -1.54
1.25 -2.18 -2.25 -1.87 -1.50 -1.52 -1.87
2 -1.60 -1.52 -1.86 -1.44 -1.29 -1.91
4 -1.40 -1.43 -1.54 -1.04 -1.04 -1.71
Consumption per capita GNI per capita 
Index Poverty line
Headcount
Poverty gap
Squared PG
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from growth away from the poor (Ravallion, 1997, 2001; Kraay, 2006).125 For example, 
based on a sample of 65 countries during 1981-2005, and using the $1 poverty line, 
World Bank (2005) reports that the poverty-growth elasticity is highest among low-
inequality countries (with a value of approximately -4.0 for countries with Ginis in the 
mid-20s) and lowest among high-inequality countries (close to -1.0 for countries with a 
Gini coefficient around 60). The change in inequality is also found as a significant direct 
determinant of the elasticity. For instance, Ravallion (2001) finds that the median rate 
of reduction in the poverty headcount ratio ($1 line) among growing economies was 
10% per year among countries with falling inequality, and 1% per year for those 
countries with rising inequality.  
Using a sample of 114 growth spells from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s in 26 
developing countries Bourguignon (2003) finds an elasticity of -1.6 in the model 
without controls and -2 when controlling for the change in the Gini. The latter 
specification increases the R2 from 0.266 to 0.419, suggesting that the heterogeneity in 
distributive changes is as much responsible for the variation in poverty changes across 
growth spells as the heterogeneity in the speed of growth. Bourguignon (2003) also 
finds positive and significant coefficients for the interaction terms between the growth 
rate and both (i) the initial level of inequality, and (ii) the level of development 
(proxied by the poverty line over mean income). He also reports negative coefficients 
for the interaction terms between the change in the Gini and those two variables. The 
first four columns in Table 21 in general confirm the results in Bourguignon (2003), 
using a larger dataset spanning three decades.126    
The results suggest the possibility of a double dividend from reducing inequality: first, 
given a growth rate, lower inequality is associated directly with less poverty, and 
second, less inequality means more poverty reaction to a given growth rate, that is an 
acceleration of poverty reduction for a given rate of economic growth. Ravallion (2007) 
illustrates the relevance of lower inequality for the perspectives of poverty reduction 
assuming a country with a poverty incidence rate of 40% and a growth rate of 2% per 
year: with an initial Gini coefficient of 30 it would take 11 years to reduce poverty by 
half, while with a Gini of 60 it would take 35 years. 
  
                                                     
125 Although the intuition is compelling, the result is theoretically ambiguous. See Ravallion (2007) for a 
proof, and Bourguignon (2003) for a case in which assuming log-normality yields an unambiguous result. 
126 Instead, unlike Bourguignon (2003) we fail to find a coefficient close to -1 for the interaction between 
the growth rate and the theoretical value of the poverty-growth elasticity under the lognormal 
assumption.   
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Table 21 
Regressions for annualized proportional change in the poverty headcount ratio 
Developing countries, 1981-2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: sample of 76 countries with information for the period 1981-2010. Poverty indicator=headcount 
ratio, $2-a-day line. Growth rates computed from per capita consumption in household surveys.   
 
In a more recent study Ravallion (2012) finds that the (absolute) growth elasticity of 
poverty reduction tends to be lower in countries with a higher initial poverty rate (see 
also the two last columns in Table 21). Ravallion (2012) finds a large attenuating effect 
of a higher initial poverty rate on the elasticity: at an initial poverty rate of 10% the 
elasticity is −2.2, while it falls to −0.5 at a poverty rate of 80%. The results are robust to 
the inclusion of additional interaction effects with the initial Gini coefficient, the partial 
elasticity of poverty reduction holding the Lorenz curve constant, the primary school 
enrollment rate, life expectancy, the price of investment goods, and regional dummies.  
Unfortunately, while the characterization of the growth elasticity of poverty reduction 
discussed in this section is useful, the literature is still far from being able to clearly 
identify the structural factors that are behind the differences in the elasticities, and 
therefore is relatively silent about the specific policies that could foster a larger impact 
of economic growth on poverty.  
 
6.7. Relative poverty  
So far we have presented evidence on absolute poverty, an option that requires 
keeping the real value of the poverty line fixed over time. The alternative is relative 
poverty, where the line is adjusted to reflect changes in a general measure of 
economic well-being. Although the measurement of relative poverty has not been 
Unconditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
g = growth rate in per capita consumption -1.391 -1.467 -2.879 -2.910 -2.111 -2.073
(0.147)*** (0.144)*** (0.570)*** (0.590)*** (0.206)*** (0.188)***
dGini = change in Gini coefficient 1.488 1.566 3.195
(0.265)*** (0.279)*** (1.206)***
g * initial Gini coeficient 0.022 0.023
(0.013)* (0.014)*
g * (poverty line/mean consumption) 0.903 0.879
(0.094)*** (0.101)***
dGini* initial Gini coefficient -0.019
(0.027)
dGini * (poverty line/mean consumption) -1.666
(0.345)***
g * initial poverty rate 0.021 0.021
(0.003)*** (0.003)***
log initial poverty rate -1.559
(0.927)*
Intercept 0.150 -0.008 0.187 0.064 -0.255 4.108
(0.225) (0.203) (0.154) (0.208) (0.122)** (2.655)
Observations 725 695 695 695 725 725
R2 0.414 0.502 0.583 0.610 0.508 0.516
Conditional on 
Inequality and development Poverty
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common in the developing world, sustained economic growth have triggered the 
update of absolute poverty lines in some countries (e.g. China and India), and foster 
discussions on relative poverty. The measurement of relative, instead of absolute, 
poverty, can be justified on two grounds (Sen, 1983; Chen and Ravallion, 2008). First, 
the very concept of poverty may depend on social norms that are likely different 
across countries and over the development process. Second, even for a fixed norm, an 
absolute line in the space of welfare may require a relative line in the space of 
consumption if individual welfare also depends on relative consumption with respect 
to the rest of the society where the person lives.  
The typical relative poverty line is set as a constant proportion of the mean of the 
distribution, implying that poverty does not fall when all incomes grow at the same 
rate. This result is considered problematic by many authors who prefer weakly 
versions in which the cost of inclusion is not a constant proportion of mean income. 
For instance, following Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001), Ravallion and Chen (2012) 
propose a poverty line that is fixed up to a critical value of the mean, where it rises 
with elasticity less than one. In particular, Ravallion and Chen (2012) set the line for 
country i at time t as zit=max[$1.25, ($1.25+Mit)/2], where Mit is the country and date 
specific mean. Figure 26 reveals an overall trend decline in the incidence of weakly 
relative poverty in the developing world. The fall has been relatively meager, so that 
the number of poor by this measure actually increased from 2.3 billion in 1981 to 2.7 
billion in 2008. While the coefficient in an OLS regression between the proportionate 
rate of poverty reduction (annualized differences in the logs) and the rate of growth in 
the mean is -1.89 (standard error=0.23) for the absolute measure of poverty, it 
becomes -0.38 (standard error=0.08) for the relative measure. Only East Asia has 
experienced a marked reduction in the incidence of relative poverty: from 81% in 1981 
to 42% in 2008. In fact it is the only region in which the poverty count was reduced 
according to this measure. Weakly relative poverty measures rose or stayed 
unchanged in most regions in the 1990s, and slowly went down in the 2000s.  
 
Figure 26 
Poverty headcount ratio with absolute and weakly relative poverty lines  
Developing countries, 1981-2008 
 
Source: Ravallion and Chen (2012). 
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In Table 22 we extend the estimates of Ravallion and Chen (2012) to 2010, and add 
estimates of strongly relative poverty (50 per cent of mean income) and anchored 
poverty, computed by “anchoring” the relative lines (50 per cent of mean income) to 
the values in 1990, updating them only by domestic price changes (see chapter 9 in 
this volume). Our view of poverty trends widely varies across methodologies: while the 
unweighted anchored poverty rate fell 32% between 1990 and 2010, the strongly 
relative poverty rate went up 2%. The differences are even larger when considering 
the population-weighted statistics.   
 
Table 22 
Absolute and relative poverty  
Developing countries, 1990-2010  
 
Source: own calculations based on data from PovcalNet (sample of 76 countries).  
Note: weakly relative poverty computed according to Ravallion and Chen (2012). Strongly relative lines 
set at 50% of mean income. Anchored poverty computed by “anchoring” the relative lines (50% of mean 
income) to the values in 1990, and updating them only by domestic price changes. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
There has been a remarkable improvement in the availability of information for 
distributive analysis in the last decades due to increasing efforts by researchers, 
national governments and international organizations. To be sure, the picture of 
inequality and poverty in the developing world is substantially sharper now than in the 
late 1990s, when the first volume of this Handbook was written. There remain, 
however, enormous data limitations that make that picture only a very rough 
approximation of reality. Household surveys are lacking in some countries and are 
carried out very occasionally in others. Changes in methodology over time are 
frequent, a fact that generally implies improvement in the data collection, but that at 
the same time introduces comparability issues with previous surveys that are difficult 
to deal with. Household surveys have endemic problems in capturing some income 
and consumption items and in dealing with selective compliance and under-reporting 
issues. The gaps with National Accounts aggregates, usually variable over time, are a 
disturbing sign of measurement errors. Comparability across countries is another big 
absolute 
($2)
weakly 
relative (RC)
strongly 
relative anchored 
absolute 
($2)
weakly 
relative (RC)
strongly 
relative anchored 
1990 40.6 46.5 28.0 28.0 64.7 54.1 19.7 19.7
1993 39.8 47.9 29.0 32.9 62.7 53.7 21.1 19.1
1996 38.6 47.4 29.1 32.1 58.0 51.4 22.0 17.1
1999 38.3 47.5 30.1 31.9 56.7 50.2 22.9 16.9
2002 36.7 46.9 30.1 29.6 52.5 49.5 23.7 15.2
2005 32.3 45.0 29.5 24.8 45.6 46.5 23.7 12.3
2008 28.7 43.2 29.0 19.9 42.1 46.1 24.9 9.9
2010 27.7 42.4 28.6 18.9 39.4 45.6 26.6 9.5
weightedunweighted
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problematic issue; there are few efforts among national agencies to standardize 
surveys or at least some criteria to gather and process information. Another issue of 
concern is the difficulty in obtaining statistical confidence intervals for the distributive 
statistics, either because agencies do not report them, or do not provide information 
on sampling issues, or do not release the microdata.127 In sum, in order to be able to 
characterize and track distributive changes with more accuracy we need more efforts 
to extend the coverage and frequency of household surveys, and improve their 
reliability and comparability across countries. There is still a long way to go to get an 
accurate assessment of poverty and inequality in the developing world.  
From the data available, some general facts emerge. High poverty and inequality are 
pervasive characteristics of the developing world, but are not immutable features of 
these economies. The evidence suggests a robust decline in the levels of absolute 
income poverty in the developing world, driven mainly by East Asia in the 1980s and 
1990s, and generalized to the rest of the developing countries in the 2000s. Income 
poverty has been reduced in most countries and in the world as whole, making the 
achievement of the first MDG possible. Despite these positive results there are reasons 
for concern. The task of fighting poverty continues to be very challenging: around 1.2 
billion people survive with less than $1.25 a day, an extremely low standard. Also, 
most of the people who succeeded in jumping the $1.25 line in the last decades are 
still poor by the standards of middle-income developing countries, and remain highly 
vulnerable if economic conditions worsen. Moreover, due to economic growth, 
concerns about relative poverty may be increasingly important, and the evidence in 
that sense is less optimistic.  
The evidence on relative income inequality suggests that on average the developing 
countries are somewhat more unequal than three decades ago. The patterns have 
been different by period and region. Inequality rose in the late 1980s and in the 1990s; 
the changes were larger in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, probably as a result of the 
transition from a central-planned to a more market-oriented economy; in East Asia, 
likely as a consequence of the economic take-off; and in Latin America probably as the 
result of recurrent macroeconomic crises and some structural transformations. 
Distributive changes became more equalizing in the 2000s, but the changes were 
rather moderate and with considerable heterogeneity across countries. In fact, in this 
decade of widespread social improvement around a third of the countries did not 
experience falling inequality levels. Reducing inequality certainly remains a top 
concern in the developing world.    
 
  
                                                     
127 The methodology to compute statistical confidence intervals is easily implementable; see chapter 7 
of this Handbook. 
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Table A.1 
List of developing countries by region and population, 2010
 
Source: population (in millions) is taken from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook. 
Note: an “X” in the Data column marks that the country has distributive information in PovcalNet.   
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa
Countries Pop. Data Countries Pop. Data Countries Pop. Data Countries Pop. Data Countries Pop. Data Countries Pop. Data Countries Pop. Data
American Samoa 0.066 Albania 3.181 X Antigua and Barbuda 0.087 Algeria 34.428 X Afghanistan 32.518 Angola 18.038 X Nigeria 150.666 X
Cambodia 13.823 X Armenia 3.079 X Argentina 39.714 X Djibouti 0.856 X Bangladesh 145.478 X Benin 8.356 X Rwanda 10.004 X
China 1324.655 X Azerbaijan 8.763 X Belize 0.322 X Egypt 78.323 X Bhutan 0.701 X Botswana 1.955 X São Tomé & P. 0.160 X
Fiji 0.844 X Belarus 9.602 X Bolivia 9.618 X Iran 72.289 X India 1190.864 X Burkina Faso 15.515 X Senegal 11.787 X
Indonesia 234.951 X Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.774 X Brazil 191.543 X Iraq 30.178 X Maldives 0.308 X Burundi 7.943 X Seychelles 0.087 X
Kiribati 0.097 Bulgaria 7.623 X Chile 16.796 X Jordan 5.787 X Nepal 28.905 X Cameroon 18.759 X Sierra Leone 5.612 X
Korea, Dem. Rep. 24.126 Croatia 4.434 X Colombia 45.006 X Lebanon 4.167 Pakistan 167.442 X Cape Verde 0.487 X Somalia 8.922
Lao 6.022 X Czech Republic 10.424 X Costa Rica 4.522 X Libya 6.150 Sri Lanka 20.217 X Central African R. 4.238 X South Africa 48.793 X
Malaysia 27.502 X Estonia 1.341 X Cuba 11.267 Morocco 31.321 X Chad 10.654 X South Sudan 8.977
Marshall Islands 0.053 Georgia 4.384 X Dominica 0.068 Syria 19.638 X Comoros 0.697 X Sudan 32.438 X
Micronesia 0.110 X Hungary 10.038 X Dominican Republic 9.665 X Tunisia 10.329 X Congo, Dem. R. 62.475 X Swaziland 1.032 X
Mongolia 2.667 X Kazakhstan 15.674 X Ecuador 14.057 X West Bank and Gaza 3.937 X Congo, Rep. 3.836 X Tanzania 42.268 X
Myanmar 47.250 Kosovo 1.747 El Salvador 6.130 X Yemen 22.627 X Côte d'Ivoire 18.987 X Togo 5.777 X
Palau 0.020 Kyrgyz Republic 5.319 X Grenada 0.104 Eritrea 4.948 Uganda 31.339 X
Papua New Guinea 6.549 Latvia 2.266 X Guatemala 13.691 X Ethiopia 79.446 X Zambia 12.380 X
Philippines 90.173 X Lithuania 3.358 X Guyana 0.752 X Gabon 1.450 X Zimbabwe 12.452
Samoa 0.182 Macedonia 2.053 X Haiti 9.736 X Gambia 1.636 X
Solomon Islands 0.510 Moldova 3.570 X Honduras 7.303 X Ghana 23.264 X
Thailand 68.268 X Montenegro 0.629 X Jamaica 2.687 X Guinea 9.559 X
Timor-Leste 1.078 X Poland 38.126 X Mexico 110.627 X Guinea-Bissau 1.454 X
Tonga 0.103 Romania 21.514 X Nicaragua 5.636 X Kenya 38.455 X
Tuvalu 0.010 Russian Federation 141.950 X Panama 3.406 X Lesotho 2.127 X
Vanuatu 0.228 Serbia 7.350 X Paraguay 6.230 X Liberia 3.658 X
Vietnam 85.122 X Slovak Republic 5.407 X Peru 28.463 X Madagascar 19.546 X
Slovenia 2.021 X St. Kitts and Nevis 0.051 Malawi 14.005 X
Tajikistan 6.691 X St. Lucia 0.170 X Mali 14.460 X
Turkey 70.924 X St. Vincent and G. 0.109 Mauritania 3.295 X
Turkmenistan 4.918 X Suriname 0.515 X Mauritius 1.269
Ukraine 46.258 X Trinidad and Tobago 1.331 X Mozambique 22.333 X
Uzbekistan 27.303 X Uruguay 3.334 X Namibia 2.200 X
Venezuela 27.935 X Niger 14.450 X
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Figure A.1 
Map of poverty in the developing world, circa 2010 
 
Source: own calculations based on PovcalNet (2013).  
Note: poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the PPP-adjusted $2-a-day line.  
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